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A foreclosure can often be a tax disaster. If the property has been heav-
ily depreciated, and so has a low basis, a sale or disposition of that property
at a price in excess of the tax basis will result in the realization of income.
Who must pay the tax on the realized income is often a bone of contention.
If a debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition, and the bankruptcy estate
permits a foreclosure of property at a price in excess of the tax basis, then the
bankruptcy estate will be responsible for paying the tax. However, if the
property is abandoned by the bankruptcy estate before foreclosure, then the
debtor must realize the income and pay the tax. This can count as a heavy
blow to an individual debtor who thought he or she was obtaining a "fresh
start" after receiving a discharge of debts in bankruptcy. Frequently, any
gain from the foreclosure is purely a gain on paper and does not result in the
payment of any cash to a debtor, even though the debtor remains responsible
for the payment of the tax.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law; Instructor, New
York University/Internal Revenue Service Continuing Professional Education Program; Co-
chair, Bankruptcy and Tax Committee, American Bankruptcy Institute. Thanks to David Carl-
son, Dick McQueen, Grant Newton, and Jim Shepard for comments on earlier drafts and to
Angela Ragsdale for her help in preparing this article.
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
This article analyzes the abandonment issue in the bankruptcy context
and highlights the difficulties encountered by courts attempting to determine
who is ultimately responsible for the taxes generated by postpetition foreclo-
sures. This article also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the compet-
ing paradigmatic models and proposals to account for the conflicting interests
and policy rationales inherent in the bankruptcy abandonment of low-basis
property. After this review, this article proposes a model that is based on an
ability-to-pay norm and that accommodates the conflicting interests
presented.
To an individual debtor contemplating relief under the Bankruptcy Code
("BC"),'1 nothing appears as precious as the right to a discharge. Along with
exemptions provided to an individual debtor under BC section 522 and a
carve-out of future income earned by a debtor from the bankruptcy estate
under BC section 541(a)(6), 2 the right to a discharge ensures that an honest
but unfortunate debtor has a fresh start to begin anew his or her economic
life.
Recognizing that nondischargeable tax liabilities3 are inconsistent with
the fresh start policy, Congress attempted to alleviate some harshness by en-
acting the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 ("BTA"). Among other things, the
BTA creates a separate taxable entity when an individual files for relief
under chapter 7 or 11 of the BC 4 and enables an individual chapter 7 or 11
debtor to elect to shorten and end the taxable year, thus shifting at least part
of the current year's taxes to the estate as a BC section 507(a)(7) priority
claim. 5 Nevertheless, certain tax claims designated as nondischargeable
under BC section 523(a)(1) (such as claims for taxes for taxable years gener-
ally ending within three years of commencement of the bankruptcy case) sur-
vive the discharge and, thus, significantly affect a debtor's fresh start.
Nothing captures the attention of a bankruptcy trustee, a debtor, the
creditors, and the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") like the issues posed
by the bankruptcy estate's abandonment of property subject to a mortgage
greater than the adjusted basis in the property. 6 Some of these issues include
1. References to the Bankruptcy Code are to Title 11, United States Code.
2. Generally, property of the estate under the BC includes all of a debtor's legal or equita-
ble interest in property wherever located and by whomever held. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)-(7)
(1988). Nonetheless, § 541(a)(6) provides that "earnings from services performed by an individ-
ual debtor after the commencement of the case" are not property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(6).
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1988) (identifying those tax claims that are nondischargeable
by individual debtor in chapter 7 or 11 case, including priority tax claims).
4. I.R.C. § 1398 (1988).
5. Id. § 1398(d)(2).
6. The basis of an asset is generally its historic cost. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988). Essentially, the
function of basis in the context of realization of gain or loss is to prevent the same dollars from
being taxed twice. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LoOic OF TAX 6 (1989). Adjusted basis is the
historic cost increased by capital expenditures such as improvements to the asset and decreased
by allowed depreciation. Id.
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who must pay the tax, whether the tax claim is entitled to priority status, and
whether any claim is dischargeable.
Part I analyzes an individual debtor's right to a discharge in chapter 7
and 11 cases. The statutory scheme behind the right to discharge embodied
in the BC is explored with an eye toward providing context to the debate. In
particular, the discussion shows that the right to a discharge is not absolute
and is not without limitation. Part II analyzes the separate entity rules em-
bodied in Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") section 1398. Unlike any other
debtor under the BC, an individual chapter 7 or 11 debtor may take advan-
tage of a powerful tax reduction tool. For example, IRC section 1398 treats
the bankruptcy estate as a separate taxable entity that computes and pays its
own taxes separate from the individual debtor. Through careful planning, a
debtor may employ IRC section 1398 to shift at least some of his or her tax
liability for current year's taxes to the estate. Without IRC section 1398, the
filing of the bankruptcy petition would have no tax significance, and current
year's taxes would generally be nondischargeable. Part III explores a
trustee's ability to abandon property under BC section 554. The history,
power, and limitations of abandonment are carefully scrutinized to
comprehend exactly what is happening, in a legal sense, to property that is
abandoned pursuant to the BC. This article concludes that by abandoning
estate property, a trustee is disclaiming his or her interest in the form of a
judicial lien in the abandoned property. The article rejects the traditional
concepts of relation back as confusing and unnecessary fictions. Part IV
highlights the attendant risks in the debate over the tax consequences of
bankruptcy abandonment by presenting an example and then applying and
critiquing the arguments for and against taxable abandonment. I believe the
issue is much closer than many suspect. Although I cannot easily dispatch
the arguments supporting taxable abandonment, the better view is that aban-
donment under BC section 554 is not a taxable event. Part IV also rejects the
paradigmatic models of abandonment and opts for a more robust and com-
prehensive model which addresses the issues posed by the tax consequences
of abandonment under the BC, and suggests modification of BC section 554
and IRC sections 108 and 1398.
I. THE RIGHT TO DISCHARGE
In filing for relief under the BC, an individual's most important objective
is a discharge from his or her debts.7 The discharge is the heart of the fresh
start policy promoted by the BC. The chapter 7 discharge is granted virtually
automatically unless an objecting party can establish that the debtor has en-
gaged in prohibited conduct. This prohibited conduct usually constitutes
some type of fraud or bankruptcy crime.8 The statute providing for discharge
7. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 27-44 (1992) (dis-
cussing fresh start policy); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., 2 BANKRUPTCY § 7-16 (1993) (same).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
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is liberally construed in favor of an individual debtor. 9 Thus, the objecting
party has the burden of establishing a ground for the denial of a discharge.' 0
Although understood as part of the warp and woof of bankruptcy law,
the right to discharge was not part of the early enactments of bankruptcy acts
in the United States.11 In fact, it was not until the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 that the law provided an individual debtor with a right to
discharge certain debts pursuant to the bankruptcy process. Moreover, con-
trary to conventional wisdom, there is no constitutional right to a discharge;
discharge is a statutory privilege provided to the honest but unfortunate
debtor 12 who has not abused the bankruptcy process.13
A discharge in a bankruptcy case voids any judgment to the extent that it
is a determination of the debtor's personal liability with respect to a prepeti-
tion debt.14 The discharge also operates as an injunction against the com-
mencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or any
act, including telephone calls, letters, and personal contact, to collect, re-
cover, or offset any discharged debt.' 5 In effect, the discharge is a total pro-
hibition on debt collection efforts against a debtor. Furthermore, under BC
section 524, any attempt to reaffirm a discharged debt is void unless the pro-
visions of the BC delineating the requirements of reaffirmation are specifi-
cally followed. 16
9. In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Johnson, 98 B.R. 359 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1988); In re Cutignola, 87 B.R. 702 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Burke, 83 B.R. 716 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1988); In re Drenckhahn, 77 B.R. 697 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re Howard, 55 B.R. 580
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
10. If a debtor has been denied a discharge in a bankruptcy case, so that all his or her debts
remain outstanding, the debtor may not include the same obligations in a subsequent case to
obtain a discharge. The denial of the discharge is res judicata as to the obligations existing at
that time, which are forever nondischargeable.
11. The Supreme Court noted the comparative newness of the discharge and fresh start
policy in bankruptcy in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973).
12. This phrase, first used in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934), has become
a fixture in bankruptcy law.
13. In re Wheeler, 101 B.R. 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 524(c). To ensure the effectiveness of the discharge, 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) prohibits a
governmental unit from denying, suspending, or refusing to renew a license or permit or deny
employment solely because the person involved was discharged under the BC, was insolvent
before the bankruptcy case, or has not paid a dischargeable debt. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988).
Additionally, under § 525(b), no private employer may terminate the employment of, or discrim-
inate with respect to employment against, an individual who is or has been a debtor under the
BC, or an individual associated with a debtor under the BC, solely because the debtor is or has
been a debtor under the BC, was insolvent before the commencement of a case under the BC, or
has not paid a debt that is dischargeable under the BC. Id. § 525(b). See generally EPSTEIN,
supra note 7, § 7-40 (noting § 525(b) only applies to "governmental units," which are limited by
those prohititions specifically mentioned in this section).
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Under BC section 727(a), the bankruptcy court must grant an individual
debtor a discharge of prepetition debts unless one of ten conditions is met. 17
Only an individual is eligible for a discharge under chapter 7 pursuant to
section 727(a); a partnership or corporation, although legitimate debtors
under chapter 7, may not receive a discharge. 18 Additionally, section 727(a)
applies only in liquidation cases under chapter 7.19
Under chapter 11, BC section 1141(d) governs the scope and limits of a
discharge. Pursuant to BC section 1141(d), the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization discharges a debtor from any debt that arose before the con-
firmation of the plan.20 Unlike section 727(a), a partnership or corporation
(as well as an individual) may receive a section 1141(d) discharge. The sec-
tion 1141(d) discharge is broader than the section 727(a) discharge in that the
latter discharges any debts that arose2' before the order for relief,22 while the
former discharges any debts that arose before the confirmation of the plan.23
17. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). Not all debtors are entitled to a discharge under BC
§ 727(a). Id. The right to discharge is a right reserved for the honest but unfortunate debtor.
Id. Over-extending oneself, unforeseen contingencies, the inability to pay debts, or lack of busi-
ness acumen are not reasons to deny a debtor's discharge. Fraud, criminal activity, and miscon-
duct, however, are sufficient reasons to deny discharge. Id. § 727(a)(2)-(4) & (d)(1). If a creditor
or the trustee is successful in attacking the debtor's discharge under § 727(a), then all claims
survive the bankruptcy case and may be enforced and ultimately satisfied. Grounds for denial of
a discharge include: (1) the debtor is not an individual; (2) a transfer or concealment of prop-
erty within one year of bankruptcy by the debtor with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its
creditors; (3) the debtor's failure to keep adequate financial records; (4) debtor misconduct dur-
ing the bankruptcy case, including perjury, false statements, false oaths, or failure to obey a court
order; (5) the debtor's inability to explain satisfactorily any losses or deficiencies of assets; and
(6) a chapter 7 discharge within six years of the commencement of the pending case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(1)-(5), (8). To object to a debtor's discharge under § 727(a), the creditor must com-
mence an adversary proceeding. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003. An adversary proceeding is com-
menced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of a summons. Id. 7004(a). Both the
summons and complaint are served on the debtor and the debtor's counsel in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as incorporated by Part 7 of the Bankruptcy Rules. Id.
7004(a) & 7004(b)(9). The litigation itself, including discovery, motions for summary judgment,
and trial procedures, are governed by Part 7 of the Bankruptcy Rules, which most often incorpo-
rate the equivalent Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the BC presumes the debtor is
entitled to a discharge, the creditor objecting to the discharge shoulders the burden of proof. Id.
4005. Section 727(d) requires the court to revoke a discharge already granted in certain circum-
stances. 11 U.S.C. § 727(d). If the debtor obtains a discharge through fraud, if he or she ac-
quired and concealed property of the estate, or if he or she refused to obey a court order to
testify, the discharge must be revoked. Id. Section 727(e) also permits the trustee, a creditor, or
the United States trustee to request revocation of a discharge within one year after the discharge
is granted for fraud. Id. § 727(e).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1).
19. Id. § 103(b) (1988).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1988).
21. It should come as no surprise that just when a debt arises has become a bone of conten-
tion. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, § 7-16.
22. The order for relief is entered automatically when a debtor files a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). In an involuntary case, the order for relief comes after the
court is persuaded that the grounds for involuntary relief are met. Id. § 303(h) (1988).
23. See id. § 1129 (1988) (setting forth the requirements for chapter 11 plan confirmation).
1994]
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Nevertheless, there are limits to the section 1141(d) discharge. First,
debts excepted from discharge under section 523 are not discharged under
section 1141(d) where the debtor is an individual.2 4 Second, if the plan pro-
vides for liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the estate,
the debtor does not continue in business, and the debtor would be denied a
discharge under section 727(a), then confirmation of the plan does not result
in a discharge to the debtor.2 5 These limitations are necessary so that an
individual debtor may not employ a chapter 11 liquidation plan to evade the
exceptions or objections to discharge embodied in BC sections 523(a) and
727(a).26
Section 524(d) of the BC requires an individual debtor to appear before
the court to receive the discharge if the court decides to conduct a discharge
hearing. At the discharge hearing, a court explains to the debtor the nature
of the discharge and warns the debtor against reaffirming discharged obliga-
tions. The discharge hearing is supposed to be a formal affair that impresses
upon an individual debtor the significance of the bankruptcy case.27 At the
discharge hearing, the court will also hear a debtor's attempt to reaffirm any
debts. 28
Despite a debtor's discharge under the BC, certain debts are excepted
from discharge as a matter of public policy pursuant to section 523(a). 29
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) (1988).
25. Id. § 1141(d)(3) (1988).
26. Chapter 11 recognizes liquidation as an acceptable form of reorganization. See id.
§ 1129(a)(11) (providing that bankruptcy court shall only confirm reorganization plan if it is
unlikely that such confirmation will be followed by liquidation or further financial reorganiza-
tion, unless otherwise provided for in plan); see also In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 881 F.2d
1346 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding confirmability of liquidation plans).
27. One of the results from the vast increase in bankruptcy filings is the loss of formality in
bankruptcy proceedings such as discharge hearings. Although intended as formal affairs, in
practice they look more like cattle calls.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d) (1988). Simply, a reaffirmation agreement is an agreement between
the debtor and one of the creditors wherein the debtor agrees to pay an otherwise dischargeable
debt. As a general rule, reaffirmation agreements are void. However, the BC recognizes certain
reaffirmation agreements if certain BC requirements are met. Id. § 524(c)(1)-(6) (1988). It is
difficult to persuade a court to approve reaffirmation agreements. Courts are particularly care-
ful not to allow the debtor, through good intentions, to throttle the fresh start provided by the
BC with otherwise dischargeable debts. This is true because courts recognize that reaffirmations
hinder and may even obliterate the debtor's discharge and fresh start. See generally EPsTaiN,
supra note 7, § 7-35 (holding court may approve reaffirmation agreement only after conducting
elaborate judicial findings regarding debtor's interest and undue hardship).
29. The following debts are excepted from discharge under BC § 523(a): (1) taxes entitled
to priority under BC § 507(a)(2) or (a)(7); (2) taxes connected with fraudulent returns, late re-
turns, or a failure to file; (3) debts incurred by fraud or false financial statements; (4) debts that
are not scheduled in time for the timely filing of the proof of claim; (5) debts arising from fraud
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity; (6) debts arising from embezzlement or lar-
ceny; (7) alimony, separate maintenance, or child support (but not a property settlement); (8)
claims resulting from willful and malicious injury to a creditor or a creditor's property; (9) debts
arising from death or personal injury caused by a debtor driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol; (10) debts not discharged in a prior bankruptcy; (11) student loans provided the non-
dischargeability of debt will not impose an undue hardship on the debtor and his dependents;
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These exceptions to discharge are strictly construed.30 The burden of proof
to establish that a debt is nondischargeable under section 523(a) falls on the
creditor asserting the exception. Among the types of claims that are nondis-
chargeable are current year's taxes and taxes for which the due date falls
within three years of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.31
II. THE SEPARATE ENTiTy RULES
Upon filing a petition for relief under the BC, an estate is created. 32
Under BC section 541(a), property of the estate includes all of a debtor's
legal or equitable interest in property at the time of the filing of the petition
wherever located and by whomever held. Property subject to exemption
under section 522 is included in the definition of property of the estate until it
is set aside as provided in section 522.33 Moreover, all the interest of a
(12) governmental fines and penalties to the extent that- they are not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss (not including tax penalties relating to dischargeable taxes or to any transaction
or event that occurred more than three years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition); and
(13) certain claims owed to federally insured financial institutions that have failed or debts owed
to a federal depository institutions regulatory agency. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
30. An exception to discharge should be contrasted with an objection to discharge. If suc-
cessful in an objection to discharge proceeding, the creditor's claim along with every other claim
survives the bankruptcy case; that is, the debtor will not receive a discharge at all. It is signifi-
cantly different with an exception to discharge proceeding under § 523(a). If successful in
asserting § 523(a), the creditor's claim will not be discharged and will survive the bankruptcy
case; that is, a § 523(a) claim may be enforced and ultimately satisfied even after the bankruptcy
case. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Thus, although the debtor receives a general discharge, the § 523(a)
claims live on. EpSTEiN, supra note 7, § 7-17, at 313.
31. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1), 507(a) (1990).
32. See generally id. § 541(a)(1)-(7) (1988) (providing that commencement of case pursuant
to BC §§ 301-303 creates estate and describing contents of such estate).
33. Id. § 522(d) (1990). Section 522(d) provides a complete list of federal exemptions that a
debtor may choose if the debtor does not wish to select the exemptions provided by state law.
Id. § 522(d). Although most states require their debtors to select state exemptions only and
forego the federal list by opting out through § 522(b) (for example, Georgia), some states like
Texas provide that a debtor may select either the federal list or the state list of exemptions. The
federal exemptions include the following: (1) an equity of up to $7,500 in real property or per-
sonal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence (as compared to
the unlimited value homestead exemption under Texas and Florida law); (2) an equity of up to
$1,200 in one motor vehicle; (3) household furnishings, household goods, and personal apparel
not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item or $4,000 in aggregate value; (4) jewelry not to
exceed $500; (5) property, not to exceed in value $400 plus up to $3,750 of any unused amount of
the exemption provided in bullet one above (i.e., the federal homestead provision); (6) books
and tools of the trade not to exceed $750; (7) life insurance; (8) alimony and child support; (9)
special assistance benefits; (10) certain rights in pension or profit sharing plans; and (11) awards
from personal injury causes of action or criminal restitution. Id. § 522(d)(1)-(11).
As one may observe, the fifth point above is a residual exemption. It permits a debtor to
apply any part of the residence exemption that is not used up to $3,750 plus an additional $400 to
exempt any type of property, including cash. Id. § 522(d)(5). This may be beneficial to an indi-
vidual debtor who owns no home but has some cash in a bank account.
Bankruptcy Rule 4003 requires a debtor to list and file with the court in accordance with
Bankruptcy Rule 1007 all property claimed as exempt under § 522 of the Code. FED. R. BANKR.
P. 4003. This declaration of exemptions found in the statement of assets and liabilities must be
1994]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
debtor and a debtor's spouse in community property that is under the sole,
equal, or joint management of the debtor is included in the estate.34 Further-
more, inheritances that come to a debtor within 180 days after the filing of
the petition, an interest in property because of a divorce decree or property
settlement agreement with a debtor's spouse, the proceeds of a life insurance
policy or death benefit plan, and the proceeds, rents, and profits from prop-
erty included in the estate are all included in the definition of property of the
estate.35 It is this property of the estate that is subject to administration
under the BC and is used to satisfy, among other things, prepetition claims. 36
The general rule is that the creation of a bankruptcy estate under BC
section 541 has no tax significance. 37 Thus, any transfer of property by oper-
ation of law from a debtor to the estate, other than by sale or exchange, is not
a taxable event under the IRC. As a result, no gain or loss needs to be recog-
nized upon a transfer pursuant to BC section 541-a bankruptcy filing is not
a realization event. 38 Moreover, there is no change in the basis of any asset
transferred. Although the transfer is technically a nontaxable event for the
debtor, the debtor does lose the benefit of certain tax attributes that auto-
matically inure to the bankruptcy estate.39 A major exception to the general
rule, however, exists where an individual debtor files for relief under chapter
7 or 11. For example, under IRC section 1398, an individual debtor's chapter
7 or chapter 11 estate is a new taxable entity separate from the individual
debtor. The precise meaning of this concept is explored below.
filed with, or within 15 days after the filing of, the bankruptcy petition unless the court extends
the time for filing for cause shown. Id. If a debtor fails to claim exemptions, a dependent of the
debtor may file the list of exemptions within 30 days after the debtor's initial time limit has run.
Id. Thus, the Bankruptcy Rules recognize that those other than a debtor are affected by the
bankruptcy case and have an interest in a debtor's fresh start even where a debtor has none.
A trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of exemptions claimed by a debtor.
Id. Any objection must be filed within 30 days after the conclusion of the first meeting of credi-
tors under BC § 341 or the filing of any amendment to the list unless the court grants additional
time. Id. Under Rule 4003, the party objecting to the exemptions has the burden of proof.
Moreover, any objection filed with the court must be served on the trustee, the party claiming
the exemptions (usually the debtor), and that party's attorney. Id.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2).
35. Id. § 541(a)(5)-(6).
36. Id. § 726 (1986).
37. I.R.C. §§ 1398(f)(1), 1399 (1988).
38. The realization requirement embodied in the IRC and in relevant case law provides an
administrative trigger for when a tax is imposed. Thus, what constitutes a realization event for
tax purposes is generally within the power of Congress to decide. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) & (c)
(1988) (governing gain and loss computation and recognition). See generally DODGE, supra note
6, at 154 (discussing scope of realization requirement and congressional power with respect to
that requirement). The realization requirement mandates that gains and losses are taxed when
realized, not as the gains and losses accrue. Id.
39. See I.R.C. § 1398(g) (1988) (listing specific items that are attributed to debtor and that
must be succeeded to or taken into account by estate).
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A. Prior Law
Before enactment of the BTA in 1980, there existed no provision regard-
ing the tax treatment of an individual's bankruptcy estate.4o The treatment
of an individual debtor's bankruptcy estate was often inconsistent, incoher-
ent, and unclear.41 The Service asserted that under the Bankruptcy Act, the
individual's estate was taxable as an estate under IRC section 641.42 The
Service drew no distinction among straight or liquidation proceedings under
Chapter VII, arrangements under Chapter XI, and real property arrange-
ments under Chapter XII. 43
B. Section 1398 of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
As part of the BTA, Congress enacted IRC section 1398. Section 1398
applies to any case under chapter 7 or chapter 11 where the debtor is an
individual. 44 The import of section 1398 is that where it applies, the bank-
ruptcy estate is treated as a separate taxable entity that may incur and should
pay its own tax liabilities.45 Thus, upon an individual debtor's filing for relief
under chapter 7 or chapter 11, the bankruptcy estate becomes a new taxable
entity separate from the individual debtor. However, if the case is later
dismissed, section 1398 does not apply.46 Thus, upon dismissal of the bank-
ruptcy case, a previously-made short-year election 47 is extinguished and cer-
tain taxes incurred by the estate as a result of taxable transactions occurring
within the estate pass back to the debtor.48
40. Although the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as amended) in Chapter X (reorganization),
Chapter XI (arrangements), Chapter XII (real property arrangements by persons other than
corporations), and Chapter XIII (wage earner plans) contained tax provisions regarding the
treatment of discharged income, it was silent as to the tax treatment of an individual's bank-
ruptcy estate. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 451, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by P.L. 95-598.
41. See generally GRANT W. NEWTON & GILBERT D. BLOOM, BANKRUPTCY & INSOLVENCY
TAXATION § 4.1, at 100 (1994) (describing confusion existing prior to enactment of BTA of 1980
regarding types of returns that must be filed for individuals and partnerships and creation of
separate entity).
42. Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 C.B. 632; Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301. See generally
NEWTON & BLOOM, supra note 41, § 4.1, at 100 (noting courts generally do not require chapter 7
trustee to file fiduciary tax return for individual's bankruptcy estate).
43. Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 C.B. 301.
44. I.R.C. § 1398(b)(1) (1988). A partnership is not an individual for § 1398 purposes. Id.
§ 1399 (1988). However, an individual debtor's interest in a partnership is treated in the same
manner as other property of the debtor. Id. § 1398(b)(2).
45. Id. § 1398(c).
46. Id. § 1398(b)(1).
47. For an explanation of the short-year election under I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2), see MICHAEL L.
COOK ET AL., FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS INCOME AND FORE-
CLOSURE §§ 8.03-04 (1993) and NEWTON & BLOOM, supra note 41, § 4.13.
48. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1398(d)(2)(A) (West 1988); Paul B. Geilich, Essentials of Bankruptcy Tax
Law, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 323, 329 (1992). Not all taxes incurred by the estate pass back to the
debtor; rather, the debtor is obligated to file amended returns for the taxable years in question,
reporting both income and losses realized by the estate, but presumably subject to exclusions
where the estate is not allowed to exclude such income, as with the sale of the debtor's principal
residence. Further, such income would be included with any losses recognized by the debtor
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The transfer of property pursuant to BC section 541(a), other than by
sale or exchange, from the debtor to the new section 1398 taxable entity (the
bankruptcy estate) is not a taxable event.49 The estate is treated as the
debtor with respect to the transferred property. Thus, any gain or loss real-
ized by the estate will have the same character as though the property were
still held by the debtor.50 Furthermore, specific enumerated tax attributes of
the debtor pass to the estate under section 1398(g). Presently, these tax
attributes include net-operating loss carryovers as determined under IRC
section 172; excess charitable contribution carryovers as determined under
IRC section 170(d)(1); the recovery of tax benefit items under IRC section
111; certain credit carryovers; capital loss carryovers determined under IRC
section 1212; the basis, holding period, and character of property; the
debtor's method of accounting; and other tax attributes of the debtor, to the
extent provided in regulations carrying out the purposes of section 1398.51
Recently, the Service corrected two glaring errors by issuing proposed regu-
lations adding passive activity and at-risk activity losses and credits to the list
of tax attributes that pass from a debtor to the estate.52 After the petition is
filed, the debtor may not use any of the tax attributes that were transferred to
the estate. The transfer of enumerated tax attributes recognizes that
although the estate is responsible for the tax liability related to the debtor's
assets, the bankruptcy estate also can use the debtor's tax attributes to reduce
this liability.53
Section 1398 furthers the fresh start policy embodied in the BC for indi-
vidual debtors. The Committee Reports recognized that the purpose of
bankruptcy is to provide for a debtor's ability to begin anew his or her eco-
both pre- and postpetition, thus potentially avoiding any tax on income realized and recognized
by the bankruptcy estate.
49. I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1) (1993); see also Rev. Rul. 90-25, 1990-1 C.B. 47 (holding that IRC
§ 1398(f)(1) applies to transfer of asset from debtor to estate, and that estate shall be treated as
debtor would be with respect to such asset); see generally Blake D. Rubin, Tax Planning for the
Debtor in Bankruptcy, 19 J. REAL EsT. TAX'N 322, 326 (1992) (analyzing tax considerations in
bankruptcy).
50. I.R.C. § 1398(g)(6) (1993).
51. See C. RICHARD MCQUEEN ET" AL., FEDERAL TAX AsPECTs OF BANKRUPTCY §§ 3.10-
.12 (Supp. 1993) (providing helpful explanation of listed attributes). Because the tax attributes
that pass from a debtor to his or her estate must be identified in IRC § 1398(g) or in a regulation,
the list of attributes quickly becomes stale. See Richard M. Lipton, Proposed 1398 Regs. Raise
Conflict Between Debtors and Bankruptcy Trustees, J. TAX'N 12, 12-13 (July 1993). But see 1A
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY i 9.04, at 9-25 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993) (suggesting that
tax attributes other than those in IRC § 1398(g) pass to estate through BC § 541).
52. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1 to -2, 57 Fed. Reg. 53300 (1992) (proposing income tax
regulations under IRC § 1398 relating to application of §§ 469 and 465 to the bankruptcy estates
of individuals). For an example of the harm to the estate resulting from the failure to include
passive activity and at-risk activity lossses and credits, see Lipton, supra note 51, at 13. The
proposed regulations apply to all cases filed after November 9, 1992. See Juliann Avakian-Mar-
tin, Witnesses Give Mixed Advice on Bankruptcy Regulations, 58 TAX NoTEs 536, 536 (Feb. 1,
1993) (discussing Jan. 25, 1993 Service hearing on improving proposed regulations under IRC
§ 1938).
53. See Lipton, supra note 51, at 12.
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nomic life. 54 Congress recognized that any expenses incurred by the estate
should not burden a debtor's fresh start. Consistent with this purpose is the
section 1398 requirement that the income and losses of the bankruptcy estate,
a separate taxable entity, be computed separately from those of the individ-
ual debtor.55 Moreover, any estate tax liability is generally confined to the
estate and its assets. 56 Furthermore, by making the short-year election, a
debtor could shift at least part of his or her tax liability to the estate as a BC
section 507(a)(7) priority claim.57 As a priority claim, the tax liability will be
paid in full before any payments are received by the unsecured creditors. Of
course, any unpaid balance of tax liability is nondischargeable under BC sec-
tions 523(a)(1)(A) and 507(a)(7)(A)(i).
Consistent with its separate entity status, an estate computes its own tax-
able income in the same manner as an individual.58 The estate is taxed at the
same rate as a married individual filing separately. 59 The chapter 7 or 11
trustee is required to file all returns required by law and to pay all taxes
due. 6° The trustee must file a return for each taxable year that the estate's
gross income exceeds the standard deduction and the exemption amount.6 1
Even if the estate generates no income from sales or the operation of a
business, the estate may be liable for taxes generated by cancellation of in-
debtedness income or by sale and exchange (for example, a foreclosure on
property that is property of the estate).
54. S. REP. No. 1035, 96TH CONG., 2D SESs. 24-25 (1980). See generally Robert W. Van
Amburgh, Tax Considerations for an Individual Debtor Contemplating Bankruptcy, ANNALS
BANKR. L. 93, 121-28 (discussing separate taxable entity status of bankruptcy estate).
55. See Rubin, supra note 49, at 326 (discussing tax consequences of separately taxable
estate under IRC § 1398(b)).
56. I use the modifier "generally" to account for the possibility of imposing transferee lia-
bility under IRC §§ 6901, 6903, especially in situations where debtors file self-liquidating chapter
11 plans with substantial exempt property. To date, the Service has not advanced this argument.
57. See I.R.C. § 1398(d) (1993) (relating to the computation and payment of estate tax); see
also 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 51, 1 9.05 (analyzing the short period election
under IRC § 1398).
58. I.R.C. § 1398(c)(1); see also Rubin, supra note 49, at 326 (noting estate computes in-
come same as individual and pays tax at "married individuals filing separately" rate).
59. I.R.C. § 1398(c)(2)-(3).
60. Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.: Tax Focus No.1 (CCH) 2 (Jan. 27, 1993). If the bankruptcy estate
has gross income of $5300 or more for the year, it must file its own income tax return on Form
1041. Id. For a thorough treatment of a bankruptcy trustee's tax reporting and compliance
duties, see 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 51, 10.03; JAMES L. SHEPARD, THE
TRUSTEE'S BANKRUPTCy TAX MANUAL 1-27 (1992) (discussing federal taxation duties and lia-
bilities for bankruptcy trustee); John Howard, An Overview of the State & Federal Tax Responsi-
bilities of Bankruptcy Trustees & Debtors, 93 CoM. L.J. 43 (1988); see also Geilich, supra note 48,
at 323-24 (providing detailed analysis of commonly encountered bankruptcy tax issues).
61. See Van Amburgh, supra note 54, at 122 (discussing tax treatment of bankruptcy es-
tate). For 1993, the basic standard deduction for a married individual filing a separate income
tax return is $3175 with an exemption amount of $2450. Rev. Proc. 93-49, 1993-42 I.R.B. 18.
Thus, the bankruptcy estate is not required to file returns until it has received gross income of
$5625 or more. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(9).
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The bankruptcy estate's gross income includes the gross income of the
debtor to which the estate is entitled under BC sections 541(a)(1) through
(a)(7). Thus, besides its own income, the estate must include as gross income
any income to which the debtor had a right upon filing bankruptcy, but which
did not accrue or was not received by the debtor before the commencement
of the case. 62 Thus, section 1398 was intended to override the assignment-of-
income principles under tax law.63 Nonetheless, section 1398 does not allow
double counting of income or losses by both the estate and the debtor. Thus,
section 1398(e)(2) provides that a debtor's gross income for any taxable year
does not include any item to the extent it is included in the estate's gross
income.64 Section 1398(e)(1) provides that gross income of the estate does
not include any amount received by, or accrued to, the debtor before the
commencement of the case.
An example may clarify the effect of section 1398. Assume that a cash-
basis individual who draws a weekly salary that is nonexempt from creditors
under applicable state law earns one payment before the commencement of
his or her chapter 7 case, but that such payment is received by the estate after
commencement. The estate and not the debtor would report the income.65
Whether the debtor or the estate reports cancellation of indebtedness
income will depend on when the taxable event occurs. If the taxable event
(e.g., complete or partial discharge, modification of principal amount, etc.)
occurs before the commencement of the case, generally the debtor should
recognize the income under IRC section 61(a) unless it can be excluded
under IRC section 108(a). 66 If the taxable event occurs after commencement
of the case, however, then the estate should recognize the income under sec-
tion 61(a) unless it can be excluded under section 108(a).
IRC section 108(a) provides that a bankruptcy debtor or insolvent tax-
payer may exclude cancellation of indebtedness income in certain situations.
The bankruptcy debtor may exclude cancellation of indebtedness income to
the extent the debt was discharged pursuant to court order or plan of
reorganization approved by the court. The insolvent taxpayer may exclude
62. See I.R.C. § 1398(c), (e) (1993) (relating to computation and payment of tax of estate,
and estate's treatment of income, deductions, and credits).
63. See Richard C. Onsager, Assigning Tax Liability Between the Bankruptcy Estate and the
Individual Debtor, J. TAX'N 102, 103 (Aug. 1991) (providing detailed analysis of relationship
among bankruptcy estate, individual debtor, and § 1398).
64. See generally 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 51, 9.04[3] (gross income of
bankruptcy estate includes all debtor's gross income which bankruptcy estate is entitled to re-
ceive pursuant to BC and all income received by estate following commencement of case).
65. See Van Amburgh, supra note 54, at 123 (discussing and providing examples of § 1398's
accounting provisions).
66. It should be noted, however, that there is a means by which to shift at least some tax
consequences from the debtor to the estate through a § 1398(d)(2) short-year election by the
debtor. Recently, the Department of Treasury issued temporary regulations requiring certain
financial entities to report cancellation of indebtedness income on Form 1099-C. Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6050P-1T (1993). These regulations became effective January 1, 1994, and apply to
discharges after December 31, 1993.
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cancellation of indebtedness income to the extent of insolvency. Section
108(b), however, provides that to the extent excluded under section 108(a),
the cancellation of indebtedness income must be used to reduce enumerated
tax attributes listed in section 108(b)(2).67 Section 108(b)(2) lists the tax at-
tributes to be reduced in the following order: (1) net-operating losses; (2)
general business credits; (3) minimum tax credits; (4) capital-loss carryovers;
(5) basis; (6) passive activity loss and credit carryovers; and (7) foreign tax
credit carryovers.68 Sections 108(b)(3)(A) and (B) provide that noncredit
tax attributes are reduced dollar for dollar by cancellation of indebtedness
income, while credit tax attributes are reduced one dollar for each three dol-
lars of cancellation of indebtedness income.69 Because of the forced reduc-
tion in attributes, section 108 is a rule of tax deferment and not outright
exclusion.70
Section 1398(e)(3) provides that the determination of whether any
amount paid or incurred by the estate is allowable as a deduction shall be
made as if paid by the debtor and as if the debtor were still engaged in the
trade or business that the debtor was engaged in before the commencement
of the case.7 1 It would appear that the same accounting method used for
income should be used for deductions. Additionally, IRC section 1398(e)(3)
permits the estate to characterize some of its expenditures as trade or busi-
ness expenses that can be used to offset current income of the estate. 72
Furthermore, administrative expenses and any fees under 28 U.S.C. § 123 are
deductible by the estate to the extent not disallowed under another IRC sec-
tion.73 If the administrative expenses cannot be used in the current year,
then they may be carried back three years and carried forward seven years
but limited to taxable years of the estate.74
Section 1398(d)(2) permits a debtor to make an election by which his or
her taxable year is split into two taxable years. 75 This election is an impor-
tant pre-bankruptcy planning tool which may be used to minimize a debtor's
tax liability.76 By timely making the election, a debtor may divide his or her
taxable year into two separate years. The first taxable year ends on the day
67. I.R.C. § 108(b) (1993).
68. Id. § 108(b)(2); NEwroN & BLOOM, supra note 41, § 2.14(a), at 51. As an alternative to
attribute reduction, a taxpayer may elect to reduce the basis of depreciable property. Id. § 2.15.
69. I.R.C. § 108(b)(3)(A)-(B).
70. Tax attribute reductions under § 108 are reported on Form 982. Form 982 is filed with
the taxpayer's return for the taxable year in which the cancellation of indebtedness income oc-
curs or as regulations provide otherwise. See I.R.C. § 108(d)(9)(A) (setting forth time for mak-
ing election). See generally Kenneth C. Weil, Effects of Real Property Abandonments in
Bankruptcy, 70 J. TAX'N 358 (June 1989) (discussing effects of § 108 pertaining to
abandonment).
71. I.R.C. § 1398(e)(3) (1993).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 1398(h)(2).
74. Id. § 1398(h)(2)(C).
75. Geilich, supra note 48, at 329-30; Rubin, supra note 49, at 327-28.
76. See generally Onsager, supra note 63, at 105-06.
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before the bankruptcy case was commenced. 77 The second taxable year be-
gins on the commencement date. The effect of the short-year election is to
make the current year's taxes a section 507(a)(7) priority claim of the es-
tate.78 For example, assume an individual calendar-year taxpayer/debtor
files for relief under chapter 7 on March 8 and shortly thereafter timely
makes the IRC section 1398(d) election. In this case the debtor has two tax
years. The first year spans from January 1 through March 7 and the second
year spans from March 8 through December 31. If the election were not
made the debtor would have one taxable year spanning from January 1
through December 31. In other words, absent the election, the commence-
ment of the case will not interrupt the debtor's taxable year.7 9 Thus, the
current year's taxes would not constitute a valid claim against the estate; the
taxes would not be affected by the bankruptcy case. A debtor is considered
to have made a short-year election if he or she timely files a complete tax
return for the short period.8 0 In our example, the return for the short period
ending March 7 should be filed by July 15.
The short-year election must be made by a debtor on or before the due
date for filing his or her return for the short-taxable year.81 IRC section 6072
requires that returns be made on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth
month following the close of a fiscal year.8 2 A treasury regulation places a
gloss on section 6072 in this context by requiring that the short-term return
be filed on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth full month following the
close of the taxable year.8 3 The election must be made on the return.84 Once
made, the election is irrevocable.8 5
The short-year election is one of the most potent pre-bankruptcy plan-
ning tools because of its wide availability to individual debtors. The most
significant effect of the election is that any tax liability for the first short-year
becomes an allowed BC section 507(a)(7) priority claim against the estate.
Thus, a debtor may essentially force his or her unsecured creditors to pay all
or part of the current year's tax claims. Of course, if there are insufficient
assets to pay the current year's tax claims in full, they survive the bankruptcy
77. A bankruptcy case is commenced upon the filing of a petition under BC §§ 301-04.
78. See Onsager, supra note 63, at 105.
79. See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(1) (1993). The debtor cannot make the short-year election if he or
she has no assets other than exempt property. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(C); see also Onsager, supra
note 63, at 106.
80. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7a.2(d) (1981) (discussing manner of making election); Treas.
Reg. § 1.6081-1(b)(2) (1994).
81. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(D).
82. I.R.C. § 6072 (1993).
83. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7a.2(d).
84. The debtor should conspicuously write "SECTION 1398 ELECTION" at the top of the
return. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7a.2(d). For a lucid discussion on requesting extensions to file the
short-year return, see IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 51, 9.05[4][b]. See generally
Shepard, supra note 60, at 157-58 (discussing procedures for debtor's election to terminate taxa-
ble year).
85. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(D).
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as a nondischargeable claim under BC sections 523(a)(1) and
507(a)(7)(A)(i). If the debtor fails to make the election, then any tax liability
for the complete year is not an allowable claim against the estate, even
though the taxes relate to income earned before the commencement of the
case.86 Moreover, if a debtor makes the election, then the debtor's tax attrib-
utes as of the end of the first taxable year are transferred to the estate to be
used by the estate to shelter income. If the election is not made, the debtor's
tax attributes as of the end of the full taxable year after commencement carry
over to the debtor.8 7
There are no easy answers to the questions posed by IRC section
1398(d)(2). Whether a debtor should make the IRC section 1398(d)(2) elec-
tion depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, a
categorical approach to this planning issue is unwise. Generally, it appears
that in most cases the election should be made.88 By making the election, a
debtor can shift at least some tax liability to the estate as an allowable BC
section 507(a)(7) priority claim.89 However, if the claim is not satisfied, it is
nondischargeable and survives the bankruptcy.
Some circumstances, such as the presence of net operating losses, may
dissuade a debtor from making a section 1398 election. Although such a dis-
cussion is beyond the scope of this article, a rule of thumb provided by Van
Amburgh may be useful:
If the debtor will benefit more from (i) the use of a net operating
loss carried forward from the first short year (if he makes the elec-
tion) to directly or indirectly reduce nondischargeable tax liabilities
than from (ii) the use of the net operating loss against projected
income of the debtor after the filing of the petition, then the elec-
tion should be made. Otherwise the election should not be made.90
Please recall that to avail oneself of the section 1398 election, a debtor
must affirmatively elect to do so in a timely fashion. This affirmative election
requirement is unfortunate and misguided, however, since the vast majority
of debtors should make the election. Many will not make the election
86. See S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1980) (discussing tax ramifications of
debtor's election to close taxable year); see also Rubin, supra note 49, at 327 (discussing tax
ramifications of debtor making § 1398(d)(2) election to terminate taxable year).
87. See Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.: Tax Focus No.1 (CCH) 3 (Jan. 27, 1993) (discussing tax as-
pects of bankruptcy and types of bankruptcy protection available).
88. Van Amburgh, supra note 54, at 144; see also Shepard supra note 60, at 150-57 (discuss-
ing benefits of debtor's election to terminate taxable year).
89. This is important because not all unsecured claims are treated equally in bankruptcy.
For example, BC § 507 grants certain unsecured claims priority over general unsecured claims.
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)-(8) (1993) (setting forth order in which unsecured claims are paid); see
also id. § 503(b) (1993) (providing administrative expense priority for certain unsecured claims).
These priority claims must be paid in full before the unsecured claimants may participate in the
distribution of the estate. See id. § 726 (1993) (setting forth estate property distribution order).
90. Van Amburgh, supra note 54, at 145; see also 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note
51, 9.05[3] (discussing the significance of § 1398 short period elections when taxpayer has no
operating loss carryovers); SuEPARD, supra note 60, at 150-57; Rubin, supra note 49, at 328
(discussing positive and negative aspects of making § 1398(d)(2) election).
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though, not because of some failed pre-bankruptcy tax strategy, but because
of their lawyer's neglect or lack of understanding of IRC section 1398.91 The
better approach would be to require a debtor to elect out of the short-year
treatment. This modification more accurately reflects the realities of most
individual bankruptcies.
In the case of a termination of a debtor's estate, a transfer (other than by
sale or exchange) of an asset from the estate back to a debtor is not a taxable
event.92 Similarly, in the case of a termination of the debtor's estate, the
debtor succeeds to the unused tax attributes earlier passed to the estate.
93
Section 1398, however, is silent on what constitutes a "termination" of a
debtor's estate. Clearly, when the case is closed under BC section 350, the
debtor's estate has terminated. 94 The question, however, is whether some-
thing short of a closing may constitute a termination. This question is
explored in Part IV below.
III. THE POWER OF ABANDONMENT
A trustee's 95 power to abandon property of the estate is codified in BC
section 554. Under section 554, the trustee, after notice and a hearing,96 may
abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate to ad-
minister or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.97 A
bankruptcy trustee exercises the power of abandonment for the benefit of the
estate to maximize recovery for unsecured creditors.98 "In matters between
creditors and the bankrupt [debtor] it is his [trustee's] duty to care for the
interest of the creditors and not that of the bankrupt." 99 The legislative
history suggests that abandonment may be to any party with a possessory
interest in the property. 1" ° Although, as a theoretical matter, a party other
91. Cf. In re Kreidle, 146 B.R. 464 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (ignoring plain language of stat-
utes defining commencement of involuntary bankruptcy case in order to "extend" time period
by which debtor could make (d)(2) election), affd, 143 B.R. 941 (D. Colo. 1992).
92. I.R.C. § 1398(0(2) (1993).
93. I.R.C. § 1398(i); see Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.1398-1 to -2, 57 Fed. Reg. 53300 (1992) (pro-
posing income tax regulations under IRC § 1398 relating to application of § 469 passive activity
losses and credits and § 465 at-risk losses to bankruptcy estates of individuals). The Service has
been justifiably criticized for its delay in adding tax attributes to the § 1398 list. One distin-
guished commentator has suggested adding investment interest deductions, suspended S
corporation losses, and percentage depletion carryovers. See Lipton, supra note 51, at 13 (dis-
cussing possible ramifications of proposed § 1398 regulations).
94. In a private letter ruling, the Service equated "termination" under IRC § 1398(f)(2)
with closing a case under BC § 350. Although similar, the concepts are not congruous.
95. Under BC § 1107, a debtor in possession in a chapter 11 case is vested with the powers
of a trustee including, among others, the power of abandonment. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1993).
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (1993) (defining "after notice and a hearing").
97. Id. § 554.
98. See FRANK 0. LOVELAND, LOVELAND ON BANKRUPTCY § 375, at 733-34 (4th ed. 1912)
(discussing how trustee in bankruptcy represents debtor and creditors).
99. LOVELAND, supra note 98, at 735.
100. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787 and 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1993). A bankruptcy abandonment pursuant to § 554 is not congru-
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than a debtor may hold a possessory interest in the property (for example, a
lessee), most often the only possessory interest in the property is held by the
debtor as property owner.' 0 ' Nonetheless, it should be recognized that, even
if the debtor is the party with the possessory right to the property, abandon-
ment chiefly concerns valuable property that is overencumbered with liens.
Therefore, once abandonment occurs, a secured party almost always appears
seeking to foreclose on the property.
A. Abandonment Under the Bankruptcy Act
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not specifically provide for the aban-
donment of property. 102 Nevertheless, numerous cases implied a power of
abandonment in a trustee. 10 3 The implied power is a corollary to the long-
standing duty imposed on all bankruptcy trustees to administer estate assets
for the benefit of estate claimants. Property that was exempt from the claims
of creditors, costly to preserve, or overencumbered, was a likely candidate
for abandonment. It had "long been a recognized principle of bankruptcy
law that a trustee is not bound to take property of an onerous or unprofitable
character, or property which will be a burden instead of a benefit."' 4 The
retention of these types and categories of property provided little benefit to
creditors.' 05  Professor Loveland suggested that estate property with no
value to the creditors is not a "real asset" of the debtor.1°6
Under the Bankruptcy Act, abandonment did not affect the substantive
rights in, or title to, the property.1°7 The abandoned property was treated as
ous to a taxpayer's abandonment of an asset giving rise to a deductible loss. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.165-(2)(a), 1.167(a)-8(a)(4) (1994).
101. See In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. 676, 681 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988) (noting debtor normally
holds possessory interest in property prior to bankruptcy filing), affd on other grounds, 908 F.2d
588 (10th Cir. 1990), affd sub nor., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
102. See In re Pepper Ridge Blueberry Farms, 33 B.R. 696 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983) (com-
menting that prior to Bankruptcy Rules of 1973, no statute or rules mentioned right to abandon
property). In fact, the power of abandonment was a blend of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act sections,
former Bankruptcy Rules, and case law. Bankr. Act §§ 64(a)(4), 70(a)(2),-(b), 77(b),-(c)(6), 187;
Bankr. R. 608 (1973), superseded by Bankr. R. 6007; Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602 (1937).
See generally NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAc. § 39.01 (1984) (noting that prior to Bankruptcy Act,
abandonment was governed by scattered sections, case law, and former bankruptcy rules).
103. See, e.g., In re A & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 B.R. 144, 146 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (noting
that prior to 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, many courts gave trustee implied power of abandon-
ment in liquidation cases); see also 1A Bankr. Serv. L. Ed. § 4:114 (noting long line of cases
implying abandonment power under Act). Commentators also recognized the inherent power to
abandon under the Act. LovELAND, supra note 98, § 375; JAMEs A. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 128 (1956).
104. LOVELAND, supra note 98, § 375, at 773.
105. See A & T Trailer Park, 53 B.R. at 146 (holding mobile park of no value to estate when
its present market value was $400,000 less than property's mortgage and trustee continued to
incur expenses in maintaining property).
106. LOVELAND, supra note 98, § 375, at 773.
107. Cf. In re Caron, 50 B.R. 27, 31-32 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (noting that issues of owner-
ship and possession of property should not be determined in § 554 abandonment procedure).
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if it had never been property of the estate. 108 Courts held that abandonment
by a trustee immediately revested title of the asset in the debtor. 0 9
Although courts agreed as to the effect of abandonment, they did not reach a
consensus as to precisely how the effect was achieved. Much of the confusion
can be traced to the peculiarities under the Bankruptcy Act. Under the Act,
title to property of a bankrupt remained in the bankrupt until a trustee was
appointed and qualified. 110 Nonetheless, this title in the bankrupt during the
interval between the adjudication of the bankrupt (debtor) and the
appointment of the trustee was defeasible. 1" Thus, upon appointment and
qualification, a trustee was vested by operation of law with the bankrupt's
title as of the adjudication date. 1"2
Professor Leonard Long has shown that courts generally embraced one
of two legal fictions regarding bankruptcy abandonment under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.113 Many courts indulged in the legal fiction that upon
abandonment of the asset, the debtor's interest in the property "related
back" as of the filing of the petition. For example, in Schram v. Tobias,114
the court stated that "[u]pon abandonment of an asset by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy whatever inchoate title or interest passed to him is extinguished by
relation back to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, leaving title as it stood
just prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition." 115 Most contemporary
commentators accept the relation-back doctrine as a means of analyzing the
chain of title to abandoned property under the present BC. The debtor was
treated as though he or she had continuously owned the abandoned asset.' 16
That doctrine, however, was not the only legal fiction used by courts. The
second legal fiction used by courts provided that the original transfer from
108. See Mason v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting abandoned
property treated as if bankrupt owned property continuously); In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581,
591-92 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (noting debtor's claims and interests in property are same as prior
to bankruptcy filing when trustee abandons property); see also Leonard J. Long, Burdensome
Property, Onerous Laws, and Abandonment: Revisiting Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, 21 HoFsTRA L. REv. 63, 91-92 (1992) (noting prop-
erty abandoned by trustee treated as if no bankruptcy had been filed).
109. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 204 F.2d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 1953) (noting title revests in bank-
rupt upon abandonment by trustee); In re Polumbo, 271 F. Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Va. 1967)
(noting trustee's abandonment of asset immediately revests title to asset in bankrupt).
110. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 70a, superseded by 11 U.S.C. § 541; see, e.g., Conner v.
Long, 104 U.S. 228, 230 (1881) (noting bankrupt retains title until assignee is appointed and
qualified); see also LOVELAND, supra note 98, § 368, at 757 (same).
111. See LOVELAND, supra note 98, § 368, at 758 (commenting that title of bankrupt is
defeasible between adjudication and appointment of trustee).
112. See LOVELAND, supra note 98, § 370, at 761 (noting appointed and qualified trustee
vested by operation of law with title of bankrupt as of date of adjudication). This was one major
difference between the 1898 Act and the 1867 Act. Id. See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 51, 541.02.
113. LONG, supra note 108, at 91-92 & n.83.
114. 40 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
115. Id. at 472.
116. Wallace v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 338 F.2d 392, 394 n.1 (9th Cir. 1964) (citing Ses-
sions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29 (1892)).
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the debtor to the estate upon the filing of the petition never occurred in the
first place.
Which of the two abandonment theories under the former Bankruptcy
Act provided the more compelling analysis? The refreshing answer to this
question is that courts operating under the Bankruptcy Act did not care.
They recognized the two doctrines as convenient legal fictions enabling
courts to decide particular issues at hand.
Abandonment completely divests the trustee of all right [sic] in the
property. The title is thenceforth regarded as the bankrupt's just as
if he had never been in bankruptcy. Whether the title passes to the
trustee and revests in the bankrupt, or never passes from the bank-
rupt, since the trustee rejects the title, is of no importance here. 117
These legal fictions were never meant to end the analysis of what exactly
happens to title in abandoned property; courts used them as a "convenient
way of describing a situation where the trustee never had occasion to proceed
and the right is viewed ... as remaining in the bankrupt." 118 This history is
important to understanding the tax consequences of abandonment under the
BC because much contemporary analysis blindly accepts the relation-back
doctrine without recognizing a counter-tradition, and without acknowledging
the limited purpose of the doctrine in the first place.
Although courts viewed the question regarding the effect of property
abandonment in bankruptcy as unnecessary, commentators nevertheless ana-
lyzed the issue with great care. For example, two distinguished 1898 Act
commentators, Professors Loveland and MacLachlan, determined that upon
abandonment, title to the property remains in the bankrupt.1 9 These com-
mentators believed the doctrine of relation back was unnecessary because
the bankrupt's interest had remained in the property all along. Thus, when a
trustee abandons property, he or she disclaims the estate's interest in it.120
B. Abandonment Under the Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 essentially codified the implied
power of abandonment long-recognized under the 1898 Act. BC section 554
recognizes three methods by which estate property may be abandoned. First,
a trustee may abandon estate property, after notice and a hearing, 12' if the
property is burdensome to the estate or of inconsequential value and benefit
to the estate.' 22 This method is commonly called "proposed abandon-
ment."'1 23 Second, any party in interest 124 may seek the abandonment of
117. In re Malcom, 48 F. Supp. 675, 679 (E.D. Ill. 1943) (citations omitted).
118. Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1940) (citations omitted).
119. LOVELAND, supra note 98, § 375, at 774 n.4; MACLACHLAN, supra note 103, § 128.
120. See LOVELAND, supra note 98, § 375 (noting bankrupt retains title when trustee elects
not to take property or right).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (1993) (defining "after notice and hearing").
122. Id. § 554(a) (1993).
123. In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897, 901 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1993) (defining "party in interest").
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estate property by order of the court where the statutory grounds are satis-
fied.125 This method is commonly known as "compelled abandonment.' 1 26
Third, scheduled estate property that is unadministered as of the close of the
bankruptcy case 127 is deemed abandoned by operation of law.12 8 This
method is commonly called "deemed abandonment."'1 29 Estate property that
is not abandoned pursuant to one of these three methods remains estate
property unless the court orders otherwise. 130
Abandonment is a form of estate property administration. The purpose
of abandonment under the BC is straightforward. The underlying norm is to
maximize the recovery of claimants. This is accomplished through the effi-
cient reduction of estate assets to money for distribution to holders of claims
and interests.' 3 ' The power of abandonment facilitates this underlying norm
by empowering a trustee with the ability to abandon burdensome or income-
draining property that would deplete the estate of resources otherwise avail-
able to claimants. 132
In summary, a proposed or compelled abandonment must meet the sub-
stantive grounds contained in BC section 554 to be effective. The property
must be either (1) burdensome for the estate to administer or (2) of inconse-
quential value and benefit to the estate.133 Because of the complexities in-
herent in administering estate assets, a trustee is granted broad discretion in
seeking the abandonment of property. 3 4 A typical abandonment scenario is
where the estate holds property subject to a secured indebtedness that ex-
ceeds the fair market value of the property. In such a situation, no value
125. See id. § 554(b) (providing that party in interest may request abandonment of property
that is burdensome or of inconsequential value and benefit to estate); see also In re Paollela, 85
B.R. 974, 977 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting party in interest may instigate abandonment of
property).
126. See, e.g., In re K.C. Mach. & Tool Co., 816 F.2d 238,243-45 (6th Cir. 1987) (referring to
court-ordered abandonment on statutory grounds as "compelled abandonment").
127. The closing of a bankruptcy case is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 350 (1993).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c).
129. See In re Reed, 89 B.R. 100, 103 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988), affd, 940 F.2d 1317 (1991)
(noting all scheduled, unadministered, and non-exempt property of estate is "deemed aban-
doned" once bankruptcy case is closed). But see Paollela, 85 B.R. at 978 (noting bankruptcy
court has power in appropriate circumstances to override abandonment provision).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 554(d).
131. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 508
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (1986); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 725-726 (1993) (requiring trustee to
reduce estate's property to money and distribute it to claim and instrument holders).
132. Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A "compelled aban-
donment" under § 554(b) also has the effect of preventing a trustee from retaining an estate
asset solely to fund a trustee's fee. Cf. In re K.C. Mach. & Tool Co., 816 F.2d 238, 243-45 (6th
Cir. 1987) (noting abandonment should be ordered unless trustee attempts to churn worthless
property merely to increase fees).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)-(b) (1993).
134. See, e.g., Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee, 819 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1978)
(noting trustee granted considerable discretion in administering estate assets); see also SHEPARD,
supra note 60, at 67 (noting bankruptcy trustees are vested with considerable discretion because
of complexity of bankruptcy proceedings).
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remains for the unsecured creditors of the estate once the secured claim is
paid.135 Therefore, a trustee administers the property by abandoning it ac-
cording to his or her fiduciary duties to the estate-in particular, the duty to
maximize the recovery of the creditors.
C. Limitations on the Abandonment Power
There are several limitations on a trustee's power to abandon property
under BC section 554. A first order limitation may be found in the language
of BC section 554. Abandonment is not proper unless the target property is
burdensome to the estate or of inconsequential value and benefit to the es-
tate.136 Although the determination of whether the substantive grounds in
BC section 554 are met involves a highly fact-intensive investigation, certain
factors have been identified as relevant to the inquiry. For example, courts
will consider the cost associated with maintaining the property, 137 liquidation
costs of the property, 38 any income generated by the property,139 a debtor's
equity in the property,140 and the exemption status of the property.' 4'
A second order limitation is found nowhere in BC section 554. In
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion,142 the Supreme Court fashioned another limitation on a trustee's ability
to abandon property. In Midlantic, the chapter 11 trustee sought to abandon
property containing hazardous waste. It was undisputed that the property in
question was burdensome to the estate and income draining.143 Admitting
that the proposed abandonment met the explicit requirements under BC sec-
tion 554, the Court nevertheless denied abandonment where the abandon-
ment effectively constituted a release or disposal of hazardous waste in
violation of state environmental laws. To justify its holding, the Court as-
serted that an implied limitation on the abandonment power existed in light
of Congress's stated goal to protect the environment. Thus, a trustee may
not abandon property in contravention of applicable nonbankruptcy law
designed to protect public health and safety. 144 The Court carefully nar-
135. The secured claim is defined by reference to the value of the underlying collateral. See
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1993) (providing that allowed claim is secured to extent of value of creditor's
interest in property, and is unsecured to extent that value of creditor's interest is less than
amount of allowed claim).
136. Id. § 554(a).
137. See, e.g., In re A & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 B.R. 144, 146 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (noting
trustee that incurs expenses in maintaining property is authorized under § 554 to abandon
property).
138. See, e.g., In re Cahall, 1 BAMSL 107 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1980).
139. See, e.g., A & T Trailer Park, 53 B.R. at 146 (noting property's ability to produce
income is factor in determining whether trustee may abandon property).
140. See, e.g., In re K.C. Mach. & Tool Co., 816 F.2d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting
debtor's equity in property is factor in determining whether trustee may abandon property).
141. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 2 BAMSL 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983).
142. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
143. Id. at 497.
144. Id. at 507.
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rowed the scope of the implied limitation by insisting that the threat present
an "imminent and substantial" endangerment to public health and safety. 145
D. Effect of Abandonment
Much confusion surrounds the concept of abandonment in bankruptcy.
Some of this confusion can be traced to the treatment of abandonment in the
context of property and tax law. The concept itself poses interesting issues
regarding the status of estate property in bankruptcy. For example, once the
bankruptcy petition is filed, is the debtor's interest in property subordinated
to or entirely displaced by the bankruptcy estate? Upon abandonment, does
the debtor's interest "relate back" or "spring forward" in the property? Has
the debtor's interest in the property always remained? What is the relation-
ship between section 554 and the other provisions in chapter 5 of the BC?
Exactly what is happening to the status of property when it becomes estate
property when the petition in bankruptcy is filed?
Too often, authorities discussing the concept of estate property start and
finish with BC section 541. Granted, section 541 is the core of the estate
concept, but like the apple, there is more to the concept of the bankruptcy
estate than its core. In particular, one cannot fully understand the concept of
the estate without considering other provisions of the BC, including BC sec-
tions 544(a), 542(a), 323(a), and 363(b). For example, section 544(a), also
known as the trustee's strong-arm power, endows the trustee with the status
of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor or a bona fide purchaser of real prop-
erty once the bankruptcy petition is filed.146
The BC does not contemplate the displacement of the debtor's interest
in his or her property; rather, the BC provides for the subordination of the
debtor's interest to the trustee's hypothetical judicial lien for the benefit of
the estate. Thus, by operation of the BC, the transfer from debtors to bank-
ruptcy estates should be characterized more like a transfer by a general levy
upon a debtor's assets than a transfer in fee simple from debtors to the es-
tates.147 "[1]t would seem more of a truism than a tour de force to regard the
bankruptcy as a levy upon the debtor's property for the benefit of general
creditors.' 148 Professor MacLachlan recognized that under the 1898 Act,
145. Id. at 505-06. Authorities have severely criticized Midlantic, disagreeing as to its ap-
propriate scope and meaning. The emerging view is that abandonment is permitted where the
public health and safety is adequately protected. In re Purco, Inc., 76 B.R. 523, 533 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1987); see also In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986)
(noting trustee must take minimal steps to protect public). But see In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.,
856 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting risk must be serious and not speculative).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1)-(3). For a thorough article on BC § 544, see generally David G.
Carlson, The Trustee's Strong Arm Power Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 S.C. L. REv. 841, 842
(1992) (noting trustee's status as judicial lien creditor is natural adjunct to bankruptcy).
147. MACLACHLAN, supra note 103, § 183, at 186-87.
148. Id. See generally David G. Carlson, Successor Liability In Bankruptcy: Some Unifying
Themes of Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created By Running Covenants, Products Liability
and Toxic-Waste Cleanup, 50 J. L. & COrNrMP. PROBS. 119, 151 n.139 (1987) (noting bankruptcy
trustee is secured creditor in personal property).
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section 70c (the precursor to BC section 544(a)) should be regarded as
"rounding out the concept that bankruptcy is a general levy upon the
debtor's assets, so as to cover assets that levying creditors might reach upon
the date of bankruptcy if bankruptcy did not occur."'1 49 Virtually everything a
trustee may do with an estate asset, a judicial lien creditor may also do under
state law.150
The term "abandonment" has many different meanings in the law. For
example, under property law, abandonment means empowerment of any
stranger to take title that is good against the claims of the abandoner. 151
Thus, X, the owner of ordinary personal property "in a tangible ob-
ject" has the power to extinguish his own legal interest.., through
that totality of operative facts known as abandonment; and-simul-
taneously and correlatively-to create in other persons privileges
and powers relating to the abandoned object-e.g., the power to
acquire title to the latter by appropriating it.' 52
Consistent with the common law's insistence that someone have seizin (the
common law abhors a lapse in title), property law abandonment does not
terminate the owner's title until some stranger asserts a better title to the
property.' 53
When bankruptcy courts use the term "abandonment," they envision
something very different from property law abandonment. In particular,
bankruptcy abandonment under section 554 never authorizes a stranger to
take title. In fact, bankruptcy abandonment mentions nothing about title at
all. 154 Additionally, section 554 is not driven by the common law tradition
that there be no lapses in title to property. Thus, property law and bank-
ruptcy abandonment differ in both context and policy concerns.
Under tax law, abandonment is the equivalent of a sale or ex-
change under IRC section 1001(c). Section 1001(c) provides for the
recognition of gain or loss on exchanges of property.' 55 Tax law abandon-
ment is a realization event. The entire amount of gain or loss on an
abandonment is recognized under IRC section 1001(c), except as other-
wise provided in the IRC.156 The taxable gain is the excess of the
value of the asset transferred over the adjusted basis of the asset. Thus,
tax abandonment, like foreclosure, condemnation, destruction by natural
149. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 103, § 183, at 188.
150. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1993) (providing for use, sale, or lease of estate property
by trustee).
151. Carlson, supra note 148, at 159.
152. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REA-
SONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 51 (1923).
153. Carlson, supra note 148, at 159.
154. See generally NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAc. § 39.01, at 2 (1984) (noting instances where
effect of § 554 abandonment does not determine who has title to property).
155. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1993).
156. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1031-39 (1988) (identifying certain nonrecognition rules).
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causes, reimbursement by insurance, and deeds in lieu, triggers the rule
of realization. 157 Abandonment serves this tax purpose and no other.158
Although property and tax law abandonment spring from a common
ancestor, bankruptcy abandonment is an entirely different species. Aban-
donment is best viewed as a disclaimer of interest in estate property by a
trustee as the representative of the estate.159 The rights and responsibilities
that existed in the property immediately before the bankruptcy filing remain
with the debtor throughout the administration of the case, subject to the
trustee's judicial lien power. In other words, abandonment of the property is
a trustee's disclaimer of its judicial lien; a relinquishment of the trustee's
rights as the representative of the creditors of the estate in the abandoned
asset. The effect of a trustee's release of its judicial lien is to divest control
over the abandoned asset, which is no longer property of the estate. 160
Therefore, bankruptcy abandonment is not a transfer or exchange for tax
purposes any more than the release of a judicial lien is a transfer or exchange.
Thus, reliance on legislative history suggesting that abandonment may be to
any person with a possessory interest in the property is misplaced.16' The
legislative history merely recognizes that a non-owner debtor may neverthe-
less have a possessory interest in the abandoned property that may be pro-
tected by the automatic stay even where abandonment has occurred. 162
Recognizing that by filing the petition in bankruptcy the debtor gives up
control but not title to his or her property until some later event allows one
to extricate bankruptcy analysis from dependence on legal fictions like the
doctrine of relation back. In fact, courts have been somewhat reluctant to
157. Realization is a rule of administrative convenience. Gain or loss could also be taxed
on an ability to pay or accretion method. See Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on
Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REv. 722, 727 (1990) (demonstrating time-value adjustments convert
realization tax model into accretion tax ideal); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A
Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1118 (1986) (proposing that taxpayers
value all assets and liabilities and their respective gains and losses regardless of realization); Jeff
Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1824
(1990) (discussing tax policy problems that arise from ability of taxpayer to delay realization).
158. There is a general requirement of taxable transfers of an exchange of consideration.
This requirement is generally satisfied in abandonments and transfers outside of bankruptcy by
the prior loan of money and subsequent release from the obligation.
159. See First Carolina Fin. Corp. v. Estate of Caron (In re Caron), 50 B.R. 27, 31-32
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (abandonment procedures not intended to determine issues of owner-
ship and possession); LOVELAND, supra note 98, § 375, at 774 (evaluating trustee's ability to
abandon worthless or burdensome property); MACLACHLAN, supra note 103, § 128, at 119 (rec-
ognizing trustee not bound to take property of onerous, burdening, or unprofitable character).
160. See In re R-B-Co., Inc., 59 B.R. 43, 45 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (holding that abandon-
ment cannot be used as means of effecting transfer of title).
161. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history
behind abandonment.
162. This is so because although the property is no longer property of the estate, it is prop-
erty of the debtor. As such, the property continues to be protected by the stay until the stay is
terminated under § 362(d) or ceases to exist under 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (1993). See, e.g., Caron,
50 B.R. at 29 n.2 (recognizing abandonment alone will terminate stay only as to estate's interest
in property, but not as to debtor's interest in property).
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recognize the two fictions under the BC.163 This reluctance has culminated
in United States v. Grant. 64 Grant involved a debtor who was convicted for
the concealment of assets in bankruptcy. 165 On appeal, debtor's counsel
spun an ingenious argument based on the time-honored doctrine of relation
back. Counsel argued that the debtor could not be guilty of hiding assets of
the estate where the assets (some unknown to the trustee) were abandoned
pursuant to a settlement agreement between the debtor and trustee.' 66 Es-
sentially, the debtor argued that he could not be guilty of concealing estate
property because under the relation back doctrine, the concealed assets were
treated as never having been property of the estate.' 67 Incredibly, a panel of
the First Circuit agreed and reversed the conviction.168 Sitting en banc, the
First Circuit reversed itself and reinstated the conviction. Obviously troubled
with the application of the doctrine of relation back in the criminal context,
the court stated:
Assuming the trustee did abandon any interest of the chapter 7 es-
tate in the [property] allegedly concealed by [the debtor], we con-
clude nonetheless that the doctrine of "relation back" is unavailing,
as it is logically and legally inapposite to a criminal prosecution for
concealing "property belonging to [a chapter 7] estate" arising
under the Bankruptcy Code.... [The application of this doctrine] in
relation to these chapter 7 proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code
would serve none of the benign purposes for which it was fashioned.
Rather, its extension to criminal proceedings for bankruptcy fraud
arising out of a chapter 7 case would disserve the interests of justice
which the "relation back" doctrine was designed to serve.
169
In dicta, the court addressed the need and efficacy of the doctrine under
the BC. It noted that the legal fiction was a convenient tool to address the
apparent gap in title to property under the old Bankruptcy Act. Under the
old Act, title to the debtor's property was often in limbo. The filing of the
bankruptcy petition and the adjudication of bankruptcy divested the debtor
of his control over the property. Thus, the debtor could not legally dispose of
the property after filing the petition. Meanwhile, title would remain with the
debtor until the bankruptcy trustee was appointed and qualified. 170 The doc-
trine of relation back was then used to fill in the gap in title between the
filing of the petition and the appointment of the trustee in favor of the
163. See, e.g., Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434, 1437 n.2
(11th Cir. 1989) (holding interest held constructively reverted back to debtor); R-B-Co., 59 B.R.
at 45 (noting abandonment cannot be used to effect turnover, recovery, or legal title or posses-
sion to any particular creditor).
164. 971 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1992).
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1993) (listing concealment of assets as bankruptcy crime).
166. 971 F.2d at 803.
167. Id. at 805; see also Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602 (1937) (holding title to aban-
doned property reverts back to debtor and such property treated as never having been property
of estate).
168. 946 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1991), withdrawn and superseded by 971 F.2d 799 (1992).
169. 971 F.2d at 803-04.
170. Id. at 804.
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trustee.171 The court recognized that the legal fiction was no longer neces-
sary under the BC because of the estate's creation immediately upon the
bankruptcy petition filing.172
The First Circuit's rejection of a blind adherence to the relation back
doctrine is welcomed. Nonetheless, the court erred in its contention that no
court had invoked the doctrine under the BC.173 In fact, at least one re-
ported case used the doctrine in evaluating the tax consequences of abandon-
ment.' 74 One distinguished commentator concluded that Grant should be
limited to criminal cases, while the doctrine should remain viable in evaluat-
ing the tax consequences of abandonment. 75 The analysis proposed in this
article goes further by rejecting the relation back legal fiction altogether and
characterizing it as merely unnecessary. By recognizing that the debtor
retains title in estate property, albeit subordinated to the estate's right to
control the property, there is no lapse in title. Furthermore, once a trustee
disclaims the estate's interest in property through the exercise of his or her
abandonment power (or the debtor exempts estate property), the debtor's
interest in the property becomes superior to the estate's.
"[Tihe trustee's status as a judicial lien creditor is a natural adjunct to
the very concept of bankruptcy."'1 76 In fact, "the trustee in bankruptcy...
stands here as the ideal creditor ... armed cap-a-pie with every right and
power which is conferred by the law of the state upon its most favored credi-
tor who has acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings.' 77
Consistent with the concept that the estate has paramount control over
and interest in estate property is the statutory turnover action in BC section
542(a). Section 542(a) provides to the estate a present possessory right to
estate property, "unless such property is of inconsequential value or benefit
to the estate.' 78 Section 542 rounds out the concepts of the bankruptcy es-
tate under BC section 541 and of the trustee as the ideal creditor under BC
section 544(a).
Finally, the role of the bankruptcy trustee as it relates to estate property
is fleshed out by BC sections 323(a) and 363(b). Recall that under section
70a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, title to property of the bankrupt vested in
the qualified trustee.' 79 The BC has eliminated the vesting of title in the
171. Id.
172. Id. at 805.
173. Id. at 805 n.8.
174. See, e.g., In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652, 653 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991) (determining abandon-
ment relates back to inception of bankruptcy case, title revests in, and taxes flow through to
debtors).
175. See SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 3-4.
176. Carlson, supra note 146, at 842 (citation omitted).
177. In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a); see also id. § 543. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAND, THE ELE-
MENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 210 (2d ed. 1993). Notice that the quoted proviso of BC § 542(a) is very
similar to one of the grounds for proposed and compelled abandonment. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)-
(b).
179. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 51, '1 541.02, at 541-13.
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trustee; rather, according to one commentator, "[t]itle is an interest that vests
in the estate."'8 Sections 323(a) and 363(b) then provide the bankruptcy
trustee with the power and authority to dispose of estate property for the
benefit of the creditors of the estate.
Collier is less than clear on the subject of what exactly happens to prop-
erty that becomes property of the estate. After recognizing that title to
estate property no longer vests in the trustee under the BC,181 it states that
title is an interest that vests in the estate.182 Later, Collier observes that
"[u]nder the Code, which provides for the creation of an estate comprised of
all interests of the debtor in property but which has abolished the concept of
the vesting of title to such property in the trustee, the estate are in custodia
legis from the inception of the case. s18 3
What does all this mean? Is Collier suggesting that once property enters
the bankruptcy estate the debtor's interest in the property is completely dis-
placed? At one point Collier states that the debtor has no interest in estate
property.184 However, it cites no direct authority for the proposition.
Outside of this direct statement, Collier's observations regarding the estate
and the property comprising the estate are consistent with the theory
presented in this article that the estate through the trustee has paramount
title in and possessory rights to estate property, but does not displace the
debtor's interest in those same assets. The theory of estate property con-
structed in this article is consistent with Bankruptcy Act commentators, pre-
and post-BC cases, and BC sections 541, 554(a), 542(a), 323(a), and 363(b).
Moreover, the "ideal-creditor" theory proposed here more closely de-
picts how estate property is treated in and out of bankruptcy. For example,
record title under state law to estate property remains in the name of the
debtor. Although a trustee may file a notice of bankruptcy and appointment
in the proper property records, no new deeds and bills of sale are filed. The
trustee's notice is merely treated as a cloud on title. Of course, BC sections
323(a) and 363(b) authorize the trustee to represent the estate and to dispose
of estate property.
Two other provisions of the BC also support the "ideal-creditor" model.
First, and more relevant, BC section 554 essentially permits abandonment to
the debtor or any other party with a possessory interest in the property.
However, if the debtor has no interest in estate property, then an abandon-
ment should generally provide the debtor no greater rights to or claim
against the property than any other party. Yet, this is not the case under BC
section 554. Second, all the debtor's legal and equitable interest in property,
including exempt property, becomes estate property. Nonetheless, the
debtor may exempt certain estate property for his or her benefit.' 85 Yet, if
180. Id. 1 541.02, at 541-14.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. 1541.02, at 541-23.
184. Id. 1 541.01, at 541-8 (stating why former Bankruptcy Act § 8 is no longer necessary).
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (listing potential exemptions).
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the debtor has no interest in estate property, how may he or she now claim
an interest in it and a right to exempt it? The terse response is that BC
section 522 permits the debtor to exempt assets notwithstanding BC section
541(a). But this analysis begins to heap one legal fiction upon another and
upon another ... and upon another. The theory proposed in this article cuts
to the quick and accounts for the relevant BC provisions and the realities of
the treatment of estate property.
IV. TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL
The tax consequences of abandoning estate property is limited to indi-
vidual bankruptcies under chapter 7 or chapter 11 because in those cases IRC
section 1398 establishes the bankruptcy estate as a separate entity.18 6 The
true controversy is whether a debtor can avoid deferred taxes on overencum-
bered property having a low basis. Ideally, pursuant to IRC section 1398, a
debtor seeks to capture the consequences of foreclosure in the estate. Thus,
the tax becomes a liability of the estate and not the debtor. Simply, a debtor
hopes to force its priority claimants and unsecured creditors to pay the tax
while walking away from any potential personal liability.
A. What is at Stake?
Neither the BC nor the IRC considers the federal tax implications of
property abandoned by the bankruptcy estate before closing the case.'
8 7
However, the conflicting interests at stake may be better understood with an
example. Assume that an individual debtor owns an office building subject
to nonrecourse indebtedness of $1,000,000. The fair market value of the
property is $500,000. The adjusted basis in the property has been reduced
over time to $250,000. The debtor has incurred net-operating losses and car-
ryovers of $250,000 related to the business property. If the lender forecloses
on the property in full satisfaction of the debt, the foreclosure is a taxable
event giving rise to a gain or loss.188 Here, the amount realized by the debtor
is a gain of $750,000, the difference between the nonrecourse debt and the
186. See I.R.C. § 1399, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-28-012 (Apr. 7, 1989) (providing that separate
entity rules do not apply to chapter 12 estates).
187. Authorities often refer to this as "midstream" abandonment. Accordingly, 11 U.S.C.
§ 346(g)(1)(B) (1993) provides that, for state and local tax purposes, a midstream abandonment
is not a taxable event. See Mark S. Wallace, Is a Midstream Abandonment of Property by a
Bankruptcy Trustee Taxable to the Estate, 77 J. TAX'N 26, 27-28 (1992) (concluding nonrecogni-
tion treatment applies to midstream abandonment).
188. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1946). Because the debt is nonrecourse, no can-
cellation of indebtedness income will arise when the property is used to satisfy the debt in full.
See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 304 (1983) (treating nonrecourse debtor as having sold
underlying collateral for debt amount).
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adjusted basis.189 Often, this gain represents nothing more than "phantom"
income. 190
If the foreclosure occurs while the property is in the possession of the
bankruptcy estate, then the estate must recognize the gain and pay the tax.
In fact, the tax claim is a priority claim under BC sections 503(b)(1)(B) and
507(a)(1), which is paid in full ahead of all other priority and unsecured
claims except other administrative expense claims (which share pro rata with
the priority claim). 191 If there are insufficient assets in the estate to pay the
tax, then the tax goes unpaid and the debtor is not liable for any deficiency.
If the property is abandoned by the trustee before foreclosure, then the
debtor must recognize the gain and pay the tax even though the tax attributes
associated with the property remain with the estate to shelter estate tax lia-
bility. The opportunity to jettison burdensome or inconsequential property
in these circumstances helps the trustee in his or her efforts to maximize the
recovery of the unsecured creditors, but does so at the expense of the debtor.
For a thorough resolution of the central issue presented in this article, no
less than five substantive provisions of the BC and two substantive provisions
of the IRC must be carefully considered. The first BC provision is found at
section 541. Section 541 defines what does and does not make up property of
the estate.' 92 The second provision is BC section 554, which delineates the
grounds for proposed, compelled, and deemed abandonment in bank-
ruptcy. 193 The third provision is BC section 523, which specifically excludes
certain debts from the bankruptcy discharge, effectively subordinating the
discharge right to certain creditor interests such as the interest of a taxing
authority to ensure payment of the current year's taxes.194 The fourth and
fifth provisions are found at BC sections 507 and 726. Together, they identify
the priority and treatment of claims in a bankruptcy case, thus accentuating
what is at stake in this context.' 95 The sixth provision is IRC section 1398.
That section creates two separate taxable entities in certain circumstances-
the estate and the debtor.' 96 It is IRC section 1398 that creates the conun-
drum posed by bankruptcy abandonment. Finally, IRC section 108 is also
relevant to the inquiry. It sets out certain rules in handling cancellation of
indebtedness income. 197 All these provisions must be analyzed before a
proper resolution of the issues can be reached.
189. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317 (holding fair market value of property is irrelevant to calcu-
lation of the amount realized).
190. See Marc E. Grossberg, Tax Consequences of Abandonment of an Asset of a Bankrupt
Estate, 50 N.Y.U. INST. 12-1, 12-2 (1992).
191. See generally Wallace, supra note 187, at 26 (casting doubt on whether nonrecognition
treatment applies to abandonment back to debtor).
192. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1993).
193. Id. § 554.
194. Id. § 523.
195. Id. §§ 507, 726.
196. I.R.C. § 1398 (1993).
197. Id. § 108 (1993). See generally James Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness Redux: The
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 Proposals - Corporate Aspects, 36 TAX L. REv. 1 (1981) (discussing
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The issues generated by the tax consequences of abandonment thrust the
bankruptcy courts into a maelstrom involving tax and bankruptcy law, sacro-
sanct policies embodied in the two codes, and provisions in the two codes
that cannot be easily harmonized. At bottom, one encounters a core contra-
diction between the two ancient goals of bankruptcy clashing like mythical
Titans-bankruptcy as a collective debt-collection device to facilitate an effi-
cient recovery of claims in a way that maximizes a creditor's return, and the
debtor's right to discharge (or right to reorganize in chapter 11). What re-
sults is a "bankruptcy paradox" of sorts. The task is to accommodate the
policies driving the contradiction while constructing a workable model. This
goal is made the more difficult and frustrating because of the failure of Con-
gress to consider the issues posed by abandonment in enacting IRC section
1398. In analyzing the various models put forth by authorities in an attempt
to resolve the difficult issues, one must not forget that those who have strug-
gled with the issues have undertaken this task with little guidance.
B. Olson Model
The model of bankruptcy abandonment embraced by most courts and
the Service is explicated by the Eighth Circuit in In re Olson.198 In Olson,
the court held that abandonment was not a taxable event, thus rejecting the
fresh start argument embraced later by another court in In re A.J. Lane &
Co.199 After the debtors filed a chapter 7 petition, the chapter 7 trustee
abandoned certain property that was subsequently sold by a secured creditor
under state foreclosure proceedings.2°° The individual debtors hired an ac-
countant to prepare federal and state income tax returns for the bankruptcy
estate. These returns reported a gain realized from the sale of the property
as a liability of the bankruptcy estate. The debtors claimed that the estate
was liable for the tax. The trustee did not authorize the debtors to prepare
and file the tax returns for the estate.201
The bankruptcy court in Olson observed that under IRC section
1398(f)(2), a "transfer" 2 2 includes the release of an estate's interest in prop-
erty through abandonment.20 3 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court stopped
short of accepting the debtors' argument based on an extension of the hold-
cancellation of indebtedness income); James Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Fed-
eral Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. Rav. 225 (1989) (discussing tax
effects to debtor when liability is discharged at less than full amount due).
198. 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991). The Olson model is based, in part, on the opinions in In re
Bentley, 916 F.2d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding tax on gain of sale not abrogated by abandon-
ment of property), and In re McGowan, 95 B.R. 104, 106 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (holding
estate is divested of control over, and title to, estate property when such property is abandoned).
199. 133 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
200. Olson, 930 F.2d at 7. The debtors did not object to the proposed abandonment. Id.
201. Id. at 8.
202. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1993) (defining "transfer" broadly).
203. Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 100 B.R. 458, 462 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989), aff'd, 930
F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991).
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ing in Yarbro v. Commissioner,2° 4 which would equate bankruptcy abandon-
ment with tax or property abandonment.
20 5
In Yarbro, the taxpayer abandoned property under principles of tax and
property law. Pursuant to those principles, applicable nonbankruptcy law
abandonment operates as a sale or exchange and is effective in relinquishing
title in the property.2° 6 The Yarbro court suggested that the finding of an
exchange requires a giving, a receipt, and a nexus between the two. 207 The
bankruptcy court in Olson found that the bankruptcy abandonment did not
transfer title, did not relinquish title in the debtors, and did not result in a
"receipt" required for an exchange. 20 8
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In holding that no taxable event occurred
when the trustee abandoned the property, the Eighth Circuit said that it
could see no reason why abandonment during the administration of the case
should have different tax consequences from abandonment of property at the
close of the bankruptcy case, which is not a taxable event pursuant to IRC
section 1398(f)(2). 209
The court commented that In re Bently210 involved a separate, but re-
lated issue of the bankruptcy estate's liability for tax on gain from the sale of
"non-abandoned property of the estate." The taxable event in Bently that
triggered a tax liability chargeable to the estate was the sale of the property.
However, title to property abandoned by the trustee reverts to the debtor as
though it never had been property of the estate, and a subsequent sale of
abandoned property is not a taxable event for which the bankruptcy estate
can be held liable. In Olson, the sale of the debtors' property occurred after
the trustee abandoned the property. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that abandonment is not a taxable event that triggered a tax liability of the
estate. The court also concluded that property abandoned by the trustee re-
verts to the debtor and is treated as though the property never had been
property of the estate.21 '
204. 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
205. Olson, 100 B.R. at 462.
206. Yarbo, 737 F.2d at 483-84.
207. Id.
208. Olson, 100 B.R. at 462-63.
209. In re Olson, 930 F.2d 6, 8 (8th Cir. 1991). This was a point the bankruptcy court also
asserted in justifying its holding. Olson, 100 B.R. at 463.
210. 916 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1990). In Bently, the Eighth Circuit held that the postpetition
sale of corn by a chapter 7 trustee was a taxable event for which the bankruptcy estate is liable.
Id. at 433. In that case, the chapter 7 trustee sold the debtor's corn crop and thereafter retained
the sale proceeds for approximately 30 months before abandoning the proceeds to a secured
creditor. Id. at 431-32. The Service then asserted a tax claim against the debtor's estate upon
the grounds that the proceeds and profits from the sale of the corn constituted property of the
estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) and pursuant to IRC § 1398(e)(1) which provides that
the gross income of the debtor's estate includes the gross income of the debtor to which the
estate is entitled under the BC. Id.
211. Olson, 930 F.2d at 8. It appears the Olson court used both legal fictions regarding
bankruptcy abandonment. Id. Many other cases have held that abandonment in bankruptcy is
not a taxable event. See Mason v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding where
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The Service's position is consistent with Olson and its progeny. In a
private letter ruling, the Service stated that abandonment during a bank-
ruptcy case has no tax consequences to the estate because "termination of the
estate" as it appears in IRC section 1398(f)(2) includes termination of the
estate's interest in property as a result of abandonment or exemption.
212
Recently, the Service issued proposed regulations under IRC section
1398, which provide that a bankruptcy estate's transfer of an interest in a
passive activity loss or credit or an at risk activity loss or credit under IRC
section 465 to the debtor through abandonment under BC section 554 is a
nontaxable transfer.213 In support of the proposed regulations, the Service
cited Olson.
The better argument against taxable abandonment centers on the pre-
cise workings of IRC section 1398. A debtor can facilitate foreclosure or
tender a deed in lieu of property where the adjusted basis is substantially
lower than the debt before filing a bankruptcy petition. In such a case, the
taxable event occurs prepetition and the resulting tax liability can then be
transferred to the estate if a short tax year is elected by the debtor under IRC
section 1398(d)(2) or if the taxable year ends before the petition is filed.214
The short-year election converts the debtor's tax liability to a liability of the
estate. This tax claim is a BC section 507(a)(7) priority claim that will be
satisfied before any unsecured creditors are paid, but well after administra-
tive expense claims and most other priority claims are paid in full. Moreover,
part of the tax liability may be absorbed by net-operating loss carryovers and
other tax attributes transferred to the estate pursuant to IRC section 1398(g).
Of course, any unpaid balance is nondischargeable.215 Therein lies the rub
from a debtor's perspective. Congress envisioned IRC section 1398 as a
means by which a debtor can shift some, but not necessarily all, of his or her
current year tax liability to the estate at a priority level below most priority
court has permitted trustee to abandon property, title revests to bankrupt, and bankrupt treated
as having owned it continuously); In re Nevin, 135 B.R. 652, 653-54 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991)
(bankruptcy trustee required to abandon asset, returning asset and accompanying tax liability to
debtors); In re Burpo, 148 B.R. 918, 919-20 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993) (holding bankruptcy
trustee's abandonment of property returns property to debtor without being taxed); In re
Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581, 591 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (holding when bankruptcy trustee abandons
property, property stands as if no bankruptcy had been filed); see also In re Ayers, 137 B.R. 397,
400-01 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992) (following Olson rule that abandonment of bankruptcy estate
property is not taxable sale or exchange of property).
212. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-17075 (Jan. 31, 1990) (ruling bankrupt estate does not incur tax
liability when property is abandoned). The Service reaffirmed its position in a subsequent letter
ruling and recent proposed regulations. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-45023 (Aug. 7, 1992) (ruling aban-
donment of asset by bankrupt's estate is not sale or other disposition of property); Prop. Treas.
Regs. §§ 1.1398-1 to -2, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,300 (1992) (same).
213. Prop. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1398-1 to -2, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,300 (1992).
214. See Section 1398 Regulations, DISTRESSED Bus. & REAL EST. 9, 11-12 (1993) (recom-
mending these strategies for debtor to transfer tax liability to estate). See generally I.R.C.
§ 1398(d)(2) (defining debtor's election to terminate debtor's taxable year when bankruptcy pro-
ceedings begin).
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (1993) (providing for nondischargeability of tax claims).
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claims but above the claims of unsecured creditors. The price a debtor must
pay to use IRC section 1398(d)(2), however, is his or her potential personal
liability for any deficiency as a nondischargeable claim.
There are several persuasive reasons against taxable abandonment.
First, abandonment is a disclaimer of interest by the estate-a release of the
trustee's judicial lien-so title and/or possession remain continuously in the
debtor. Thus, the abandonment does not result in a sale, exchange, or other
disposition from the estate to the debtor. This reason alone is sufficient to
show that abandonment is not a taxable event.
Second, the termination of the estate's interest in property through
abandonment is congruous to "termination of the estate" under IRC section
1398(f)(2). To equate "termination" under IRC section 1398(0(2) with "clos-
ing the case" under BC section 350 is improper. Although closing a case is a
form of termination, it does not exhaust all forms of termination. After all, if
Congress sought to equate termination under IRC section 1398(0(2) with
case closings under BC section 350, it could have easily used the term "clos-
ing" in IRC section 1398(0(2) instead of the term "termination." Congress
chose not to do so even though BC section 350 predates IRC section 1398.
This reason addresses the equitable argument advanced by the Lane court.
216
Third, requiring foreclosure of the property while it is part of the estate
results in all tax liability being treated as an administrative expense claim that
will be paid not only before the unsecured creditors, but also before all prior-
ity claims under BC sections 507(a)(2) through (a)(7).217 Therefore, the
other administrative expense claims like attorney's fees of the debtor and
trustee, the trustee's fees, bankruptcy fees, other estate taxes, and certain
postpetition tort claims, may not be paid in full; they must share pro rata with
the estate's current year's tax claim. Moreover, certain employee wage
claims, pension fund claims, and consumer claims may never receive any dis-
tribution. Thus, delaying an inevitable property foreclosure by filing bank-
ruptcy may reward a debtor at the expense of all his or her creditors. This
result makes no sense.
Fourth, as constructed, IRC section 1398 provides a mechanism by which
a debtor may shift at least part of any tax liability to the estate by allowing
the taxable event to occur before filing the bankruptcy petition and electing
to terminate the taxable year.218 Thus, the symmetry of IRC section 1398
between liability and attributes may be preserved and settlements between a
debtor and creditor before a bankruptcy filing encouraged.
Fifth, abandonment is not tantamount to foreclosure. Most often, the
automatic stay will prevent the foreclosure at least until the creditor obtains
relief from the stay. Meanwhile, the debtor could attempt to settle the mat-
ter to minimize the tax consequences.
216. See infra Part IV.C.
217. See SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 88 (noting taxes incurred during estate administration
are first priority expenses).
218. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2).
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Sixth, if there are insufficient assets in the estate to pay the tax liability,
it will never be paid. The debtor does not owe the tax.219 This result is in-
consistent with the "tax favoritism" provided to an individual debtor under
IRC section 1398.
Seventh, it would appear that because abandonment is treated as a taxa-
ble event, the basis of the property might be "stepped up" to its fair market
value on abandonment and the debtor may receive a new holding period.
220
This may result in a windfall to the debtor, especially where the foreclosure
never occurs.221 Congress could not have intended such a result.
Finally, although important, a debtor's fresh start is not absolute. In
fact, under the BC it is a rebuttable presumption. 22 2 Congress has
subordinated a debtor's fresh start to several tax claims, including current
year's taxes and taxes for taxable years ending within three years of com-
mencement of the case.223
C. Lane Model
The case that supports the proposition that the estate should shoulder
the tax consequences associated with the abandonment and subsequent fore-
closure of property is In re A.J. Lane & Co.22 4 Lane stands in stark contrast
to Olson. In Lane, the court denied the chapter 11 trustee's motion to aban-
don property of the estate essentially because the debtor's tax liability would
impair the debtor's fresh start. There, pursuant to BC section 554, the trustee
sought to abandon two properties and a partnership interest in a partnership
that owned a third property.2 25 The debtor objected, arguing that the sub-
stantive grounds under BC section 554 for abandonment were not met and
that the abandonment "would shift foreclosure tax consequences from the
bankruptcy estate to the debtor and would destroy the debtor's opportunity
for a fresh start."'226 Clearly, the trustee's sole reason for abandoning the
property was to avoid the substantial income tax liability upon foreclosure on
property that was of inconsequential value to the estate and burdensome to
administer.227 The facts show that the estate would have incurred a tax
liability of about $3,270,000 on all the properties after using available loss
219. Id.
220. For a general discussion of this and other related issues, see COOK ET AL., supra note
47, § 8.08.
221. Id.
222. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1993) (outlining circumstances under which court may not
grant debtor discharge).
223. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1993) (outlining taxes which take priority over other debts);
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (1993) (providing for nondischargeability of § 507(a)(7) tax claims).
224. 133 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
225. Id. at 266. The motion was amended to exclude two of the properties that were subse-
quently refinanced. Id. at 266-67.
226. Id. at 266.
227. Id.
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carryovers.228 The debtor's tax liability would have been about $13,000,000.
The debtor probably would not have been able to reduce taxable income by
loss carryovers because those tax attributes were transferred to the estate
pursuant to IRC section 1398(g) and would not be transferred back to the
debtor, if at all, until the estate terminated.
229
The Lane court gave three reasons for denying the trustee's motion to
abandon the property. 230 First, because the facts suggested that foreclosure
on the property was imminent, the Court Holding doctrine231 persuaded the
court to view the abandonment as a transfer from the estate directly to the
secured lender with the debtor acting as a mere conduit. Second, the court
held that abandonment itself is a taxable event, and that to shift the tax con-
sequences to the debtor would destroy the symmetry of IRC section 1398
that intends to link a tax liability with its tax attributes. Third, the court held
that to allow a trustee to abandon overencumbered, low-basis property
would severely throttle the fresh start policy of the BC.23 2 Each rationale for
the Lane court's holding is addressed in turn.
228. See generally Craig W. Friedrich, Workouts, 20 J. REAL EST. TAX. 94-95 (Fall 1992)
(discussing Lane's impact on abandonment tax consequences).
229. See I.R.C. § 1398(i) (allowing return of tax attributes to debtor upon termination of
estate). Thus, the substantial difference between the debtor's and the estate's tax liability is a
$10,000,000 swing.
230. Aside from the reasons discussed in the text of the article, the Lane court also ques-
tioned the merits of the abandonment. Although there existed no equity in the properties, the
court observed there, nevertheless, might be value in the properties for the estate. The court
based this observation on two points. First, the court suggested that BC § 506(a), which defines
a secured claim, applies and made it more likely than not that value existed for the estate. Sec-
ond, the court suggested that a trustee could use the cramdown provisions in chapter 11, see 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1993) (providing for plan confirmation where plan does not discriminate un-
fairly and provide fair and equitable treatment despite plan's failure to comply with
§ 1129(a)(8)), to retain the property for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. Lane, 133 B.R. at
269. Aside from the time-honored rule that vests broad discretion in a trustee in deciding to
abandon property under BC § 554, the Lane court's observations make no sense. The secured
creditors were seeking foreclosure. Section 506(a) would not help, especially where the property
is not appreciating. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992) (holding bifurcation
provisions of § 506(a) and lien-voiding provisions of § 506(d) do not permit a real estate lien to
be "stripped down" where debtor has abandoned property). See generally Mary Josephine New-
born, Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, Nobleman, and the Decline of Priority,
25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547, 558-72 (1993) (discussing effects of Dewsnup on undersecured creditors).
The secured claims completely enveloped the value of the properties. Finally, cramdown is not a
panacea; it is also a lot easier to threaten than it is to successfully invoke under BC § 1129(b).
See generally Kenneth Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 133-46, 171 (1979) (addressing complexities and
uncertainties of cramdown rules). Thus, the value the Lane court was alluding to was whimsical
at best.
231. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (holding substance of
transaction viewed as whole is controlling for tax purposes). In Court Holding, the Supreme
Court articulated the "step-transaction" doctrine which requires collapsing each separate step in
the transaction into one transaction, thereby ensuring that the substance of the transaction con-
trols over its form. Id. at 334.
232. Lane, 133 B.R. at 274; see also In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992)
(adopting Lane analysis because of "overriding fresh start" bankruptcy policy).
19941
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
The court's application of the Court Holding doctrine is unpersuasive
even on the particular facts in Lane.233 In essence, the court concluded that
the estate would abandon directly to the creditor with the debtor being a
conduit. Foreclosure, however, does not necessarily follow abandonment. In
fact, most often a creditor could not have foreclosed until it obtained relief
from the stay under BC section 362(d). Furthermore, operation of the stay as
well as any applicable statutory periods under state law would have permit-
ted a now more motivated debtor to workout the situation with the credi-
tor.234 Finally, Professor Jim Shepard cleverly and convincingly dispatches
with the Lane court's reliance on the Court Holding doctrine. Professor
Shepard shows that the Lane court in fact extracted the abandonment from
the "complete" transaction. 235 According to Shepard, the beginning point in
viewing the Court Holding doctrine should include the point at which the
debtor decided to seek relief under the BC. Thus, bankruptcy relief is but
one step through which the property passed from the debtor to his or her
creditors.23 6 In other words, where we begin the step-transaction analysis
under the Court Holding doctrine is not as self-evident as the Lane court
appears to suggest.
The second reason the Lane court offered is that abandonment itself was
a taxable event, a position inconsistent with all prior authority. 237 Clearly, a
foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is a taxable event.238 But is
abandonment a taxable event? I think not. As suggested here, if a debtor's
interest has always remained in the property, albeit subordinated to the es-
tate's interest until abandonment, there can be no sale, exchange, or disposi-
tion from the estate to the debtor upon abandonment because the debtor
always owned the property. Moreover, a basic tenet of tax law is that form
does control sometimes.239 If bankruptcy law treats abandoned property as
233. The Court Holding doctrine is always a facts and circumstances test. See Grossberg,
supra note 190, at 12-8 (noting problems in applying Court Holding doctrine to specific facts).
234. Id.
235. SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 72-73.
236. Id. at 73. The Lane court's reliance on the Court Holding doctrine denies the essential
factual foundation of Court Holding. In Court Holding, the Supreme Court characterized the
transaction there as an attempt to evade taxes through the negotiations between the parties. 324
U.S. at 333. There a corporation was attempting to transfer property already the subject of a
sales transaction to another party for the sole purpose of having the other taxed on the sale.
SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 73. In the abandonment context there is no attempt to evade taxes,
but merely an attempt to shift liability from the debtor to the estate.
237. See, e.g., In re Olson, 930 F.2d 6, 8 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that abandonment of prop-
erty by bankrupt estate is not taxable event because it is neither "sale" nor "exchange"); In re
McGowan, 95 B.R. 104, 108 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (holding that abandonment of bankruptcy
estate property is not "sale" or "exchange" triggering tax liability to estate).
238. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510 (1941) (holding foreclosure of mortgage
with recourse was event which established "loss" of capital asset for tax purposes); Helvering v.
Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 115 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1940), rev'd per curiam, 312 U.S.
666 (1941) (holding state's taxing of real property for nonpayment of taxes established "loss" for
tax purposes).
239. For a recent case recognizing this tenet, see Richard Hansen Land, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2869, 2874 (1993) (stating that "[t]he question in this case is not one of
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if it had never been property of the estate, tax law should acquiesce. If aban-
doned property is not property of the estate, abandonment cannot be a
taxable event.24°
To justify the conclusion that abandonment is a taxable event, the Lane
court reviewed IRC section 1398(f)(2). Section 1398(f)(2) provides that the
transfer back to a debtor from the estate is not a disposition when the trans-
fer occurs with the termination of the estate, unless by sale or exchange. The
Lane court held that the abandonment was not tantamount to the termina-
tion of the estate as required by IRC section 1398(f)(2) and must, therefore,
be a taxable event. 241 This justification was expressly rejected by the court in
In re McGowan,242 which held that "termination of the estate" for purposes
of IRC section 1398(f)(2) included termination of the estate's interest in
property under BC section 554(a). 243
The confusion over whether abandonment is a taxable event is created
by using the word "terminate" in IRC section 1398(f)(2). Does "terminate"
mean the case is closed under BC section 350? The Service has taken such a
position, I believe unjustifiably. 2 4 Exactly when the estate terminates for
IRC section 1398 purposes remains unclear. For example, in a chapter 11
case, confirmation of the plan and post-confirmation operation even for a
number of years is not congruous to closing the case under BC section 350.
Thus, something less than a BC section 350 "closing" should satisfy the termi-
nation requirement under IRC section 1398(f)(2). Therefore, the better
argument is that once the estate's interest in the property terminates through
abandonment, it terminates for IRC section 1398(f)(2) purposes as to the
property abandoned.245
The Lane court embraced a "strict" interpretation of IRC section
1398(f)(2) in concluding that abandonment is a "sale or exchange" for tax
purposes. This argument, however, proves too much. IRC section
1398(f)(1), which governs the transfer of assets and liabilities from the debtor
to the estate upon filing the bankruptcy petition, makes the transfer a non-
recognition event unless it is by "sale or exchange." According to the Lane
purpose but whether the acquisitions of the estates ... 'were in fact what they appear to be in
form"'). But see Friedrich, supra note 228, at 96 n.21 (noting general tax law tenent is that
substance over form controls).
240. See SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 76 (noting abandonment should follow established
property tax principles).
241. In re AJ. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 272-73 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
242. 95 B.R 104 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
243. Id. at 108.
244. See SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 66-67 (citing Service letter for that proposition). Pro-
fessor Shepard notes that this position is inconsistent with In re Sonner, 53 B.R. 859 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1985) (holding that, for tax purposes, chapter 11 case terminates when plan is con-
firmed). Shepard defines termination by reference to probate estate and partnership termina-
tions. SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 66-67.
245. See In re Olson, 930 F.2d 6, 8 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting although trustee is relieved of
administering unprofitable asset under BC when abandoned, this is not kind of benefit required
for "sale or exchange" under IRC).
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court, if the transfer-if one even exists-from the estate to the debtor pur-
suant to abandonment under BC section 554 is a "sale or exchange," then the
transfer from the debtor to the estate also would be a "sale or exchange,"
taking that transfer out of nonrecognition status under IRC section
1398(f)(1). Thus, the transfer by a debtor to the estate becomes a realization
event. Reliance on Lane and the Court Holding doctrine suggests such an
analysis.246 Of course, this analysis eviscerates the essential purpose behind
IRC section 1398.
In suggesting that bankruptcy abandonment is a taxable event, the Lane
court also relied on Yarbro v. Commissioner247 and similar tax court deci-
sions. In Yarbro, the Fifth Circuit characterized abandonment under tax law
as a sale or exchange, and, thus, a taxable event. In a situation where an
abandonment under applicable nonbankruptcy law of overencumbered prop-
erty has occurred, a taxpayer receives a taxable benefit in the amount of the
secured debt discharged. 248 Therefore, applicable nonbankruptcy abandon-
ment becomes an event no different in tax significance from a foreclosure
sale or deed in lieu. Asserting that a trustee conveyed property and received
a benefit in the form of relief from the secured debt, the Lane court regarded




The Lane court erred in attempting to equate tax abandonment with
bankruptcy abandonment. The concept of abandonment for general tax
purposes borrows heavily from the common law of property. In contrast,
bankruptcy abandonment is a creature of statute; it has a specific meaning in
bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy abandonment is a disclaimer by the estate of
any interest in a specific asset of the debtor. Thus, the debtor's interest in the
property remains undisturbed. To attempt artificially to weld the two distinct
concepts of abandonment together would deny a rich and vibrant history as-
sociated with bankruptcy abandonment and the peculiar nature and purpose
of this statutory beast.
A corollary to the second justification for treating abandonment as a
taxable event relied on by the Lane court is that to allow the trustee to aban-
don the property would destroy the symmetry between IRC sections
1398(f)(2) and 1398(i). 25 0 This point is the most persuasive offered by the
court. Section 1398(f)(2) provides that the transfer of property (other than
by sale or exchange) from the estate to the debtor upon termination of the
estate is not a taxable event. Section 1398(i) provides that the debtor suc-
ceeds to the estate's tax attributes on termination of the estate. By allowing
the trustee to abandon property, the estate may shift the associated tax liabil-
ity to the debtor while retaining the enumerated tax attributes that could
have been used by the debtor to offset the amount realized from the subse-
246. See Wallace, supra note 187, at 29-30 (noting this argument, but suggesting that Olson
and other contrary opinions have significant flaws).
247. 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1984).
248. In re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 270 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 273.
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quent foreclosure. Of course, this is also the result where the property is
deemed abandoned because it was not administered by the trustee.251 More-
over, any tax attributes not used by the estate will ultimately revert back to
the debtor upon termination of the estate and will be available to offset
taxable income in the year of foreclosure, possibly ameliorating some of the
harshness. 5 2 Nevertheless, fairness remains an essential element of bank-
ruptcy and tax policy. It is not fair to allow a trustee to abandon property
from the estate on the verge of foreclosure and, at the same time, retain for
the estate the associated tax attributes.
One distinguished commentator seizes upon this lack of symmetry as a
justification for characterizing abandonment as a taxable event.253 Although
the Olson model suggests this lack of symmetry, the conclusion that the sym-
metry between IRC sections 1398(f)(2) and 1398(i) is destroyed is not
inescapable. One could persuasively argue that if abandonment is congruous
to termination under IRC section 1398(f)(2), it should also be congruous to
termination under IRC section 1398(i). Termination for one should be termi-
nation for the other. Thus, when property is abandoned, the tax attributes
listed in IRC section 1398(g) should also remain with the property to the
extent they can be reasonably traced. This is the position taken by the Ser-
vice in proposed regulations concerning passive activity and at-risk losses and
credits.254 This combined reading of IRC sections 1398(f)(2) and (i) is ana-
lyzed in greater detail in Part IV.D below.
The third reason offered by the Lane court for treating abandonment as
a taxable event is that abandonment of the property would shift the tax liabil-
ity from the estate to the debtor, thus depriving the debtor of a robust fresh
start. If the estate abandoned the property in our example, and the lender
subsequently foreclosed the lien, then the postpetition tax would not be dis-
chargeable. The debtor owes the tax. Nevertheless, as discussed previously,
many tax claims as mandated by Congress weaken the fresh start policy. Sec-
tion 523(a)(1) recognizes that the debtor's fresh start is subordinate to the
Government's interest in collecting certain taxes for its operations, in particu-
lar, postpetition taxes and taxes entitled to priority under BC section
507(a). 255
One can sense the struggle engaged in by Bankruptcy Judge Queenan in
Lane. The $10,000,000 swing in tax liability between the estate and* the
251. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1993) (providing that unless court orders otherwise, any prop-
erty scheduled under § 521(1) not otherwise administered at time of case closing is abandoned to
debtor).
252. See SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 74-75 (noting possible tax attributes transferred to
debtor upon termination of estate).
253. See Lipton, supra note 51, at 14-15 (noting that if abandonment is not taxable event to
estate, tax consequences will be imposed on debtor, who no longer has tax attributes that relate
to ownership of asset).
254. See Prop. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1398-1(d)(2) to -2(d)(2), 57 Fed. Reg. 53300-02 (1992) (pro-
posing bankruptcy estate succeed to unused passive activity losses and credits of individual
debtor in chapter 7 or 11 case).
255. SHEPARD, supra note 60, at 75; In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1989).
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debtor forced by the superficial peculiarities of IRC sections 1398(0(2) and
1398(i) appears to be patently unfair and produces a harsh result.256 Bank-
ruptcy is a never-ending contradiction between a creditor's debt-collection
activity and a debtor's discharge. Based on Congress's failure to foresee the
vagaries associated with midstream abandonment, Judge Queenan struck the
balance in favor of the debtor by denying the proposed abandonment. Thus,
in a very real sense, Judge Queenan fashioned another implied limitation on
the trustee's power to abandon property under BC section 554, a limitation
not found in the language of the statute itself. In that fashion, he has done
nothing more than the Supreme Court did in Midlantic.257 In fact, there are
several similarities between the two opinions.25 8 First, both the fresh start
policy limitation in Lane and the environmental policy limitation in Midlantic
are not supported by the language of BC section 554, but are implied limita-
tions on the power of abandonment. Second, both of these countervailing
policies are of great force-the former draws its force from the BC, while the
latter draws its force from state and federal environmental laws. Third, be-
cause the effect of both limitations is to force the estate to retain burdensome
or income-draining assets, both limitations feed off the priority claimants and
unsecured creditors of the estate, effectively forcing these creditor classes to
subsidize taxing and environmental authorities while allowing a debtor to
walk free from his obligations (at least in the tax context).
Lane generated more questions than it answered. If abandonment is a
taxable event, what is the new basis in the property? If the lender never
forecloses on the property, does the debtor receive a stepped-up basis in the
property? A new holding period? If that is the case, is it not unfair? Would
this not result in a windfall to the debtor? These important tax questions go
unanswered in Lane.
The most troubling aspect of about Judge Queenan's decision in Lane is
not its failure to address these tax issues (after all, they can and will be ad-
dressed later), but the failure to recognize the repercussions of Lane on its
particular facts. For example, Lane is a chapter 11 case commenced by an
individual debtor. Judge Queenan was correct when he observed that an in-
dividual's right to discharge is a compelling policy under the BC. But so is
the policy of reorganization. After all, Lane is a chapter 11 case. Yet no-
where in the opinion does the court discuss or even mention the effect the
denial of the proposed abandonment will have on the reorganizational efforts
256. Often, fairness is in the eye of the beholder. After all, many of these debtors had the
use of and presumably enjoyed the money, generated income or acquired other properties, and
paid down debt secured by otherwise exempt property. Additionally, these debtors received the
benefit of accelerated depreciation to shelter income.
257. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986). See supra
Part III.C and accompanying notes for a discussion of limitations on the power of abandonment.
258. These similarities were not lost by one commentator. See NEWrON & BLOOM, supra
note 41, § 4.11(a)(i), at 121 (comparing Midlantic to situations found by bankruptcy trustees who
have recovered estate property, sale of which creates greater tax burden than amount received
by estate).
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of the estate. Lane is no dog real estate case. The chapter 11 trustee had
already come to terms with lenders on two of the properties. But the court
transformed the reorganizational landscape by ordaining a tax claim that
would not have been a legitimate claim against the estate into a $3,000,000
administrative expense claim. Because this claim must be paid in full before
most of the BC section 507(a) priority claims and all of the unsecured claims,
and within the strict timing requirements on such payments under BC section
1129, the Lane decision must have had an onerous impact on the feasibility
and ultimate confirmability of any chapter 11 plan.259 Unfortunately, we are
left with troubling questions and no hint of an answer.
D. Tax Attribute Model
A variation of the Lane model addresses the potent argument that it is
patently unfair to allow a trustee to avoid the tax consequences of the imme-
diate foreclosure of the property through abandonment and, simultaneously,
to retain the tax attributes associated with the property to shield income of
the estate. Thus, abandonment destroys the calculated symmetry between
IRC sections 1398(f)(2) and 1398(i). This unfair result may be dictated by the
Olson model. But, as noted above, such a result is not necessarily dictated by
IRC sections 1398(f)(2) and 1398(i). For example, if midstream abandon-
ment is a termination for IRC section 1398(f)(2) purposes, it should similarly
equate to a termination for IRC section 1398(i) purposes. This construction
of IRC section 1398 avoids the symmetry problem generated in Olson and
similar cases.
The Service has recently taken the position that as to those attributes it
adds to IRC section 1398(g) by regulation, it would be unfair to saddle a
debtor with tax liability upon abandonment and subsequent foreclosure while
allowing the estate to retain the tax attributes associated with the property.
Accordingly, if the estate transfers an interest in a passive activity, former
passive activity, or an unused IRC section 465 loss from an abandoned activ-
ity by midstream abandonment before the termination of the estate (as
defined by the Service), then:
(1) the estate must allocate to the transferred interest part or all of
the estate's unused passive activity loss and unused passive activity
credit, determined as of the first day of the estate's tax year in which
the transfer occurs, and (2) the debtor succeeds to and takes into
account, beginning with the debtor's tax year in which the transfer
occurs, the unused passive activity loss and unused passive activity
credit allocated to the transferred interest. 260
259. As a condition for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan, all tax claims that constitute
administrative expenses under § 507(a)(1) must be paid in full in cash on the effective date of the
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (1988). In contrast, tax claims that constitute priority claims under
§ 507(a)(7) may be paid in deferred cash payments over six years from the date of assessment of
the tax claim. Id.
260. Lipton, supra note 51, at 15.
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The Service has gone far to recognize the harm to a debtor caused by the
lack of symmetry posed by the Olson model. The new proposed regulations
ameliorate some of that harm. However, as Richard Lipton cogently ob-
serves, the proposed regulations do not go far enough.261 The regulations do
not cover the other IRC section 1398(g) tax attributes such as net operating
loss carryovers and credits that relate to the abandoned property.262 Thus,
under the Olson model, these other tax attributes remain with the estate.
Lipton. surmises that the Service may not have provided (if it had the author-
ity to do so in the first place) that remaining IRC section 1398(g) attributes
follow the abandoned property because the Service was concerned that no
specific rules exist for the allocation of net operating losses and credits to the
various assets of a debtor.
263
The symmetry problem may be overstated. The mandatory adjustment
of tax attributes at the end of the taxable year in which the discharge is
entered effectively deprives the estate of the use and benefit of any attrib-
utes.264 Thus, symmetry may be an illusion in the first place. Additionally, a
flaw in the symmetry argument is that the argument is premised on the
assumption that any tax attributes generated with regard to the property pro-
posed to be abandoned actually exist at the time the debtor filed for relief
under the BC. First, the debtor may have used these attributes by means of
an IRC section 1398 election. Second, many debtors may have already used
these attributes to shelter prepetition income; therefore, the attributes may
never have been available to the estate in any event.
265
I believe Lane may have been on safer ground if it had articulated this
model of the tax effects of abandonment. There is a fairness question posed
by the Olson model. Nonetheless, as a normative principle, I do not believe
the tax attribute model goes far enough to protect the debtor's and creditors'
interests.
E. ABA Model
In 1993, the Section 108 Real Estate and Partnership Task Force ("Task
Force") of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association pub-
lished a report on the tax consequences posed by bankruptcy abandonment
before the close of the case.266 After noting judicial disagreement on the
subject, the Task Force proceeded to disagree among itself. The majority
camp embraced Lane as its working model, while the minority camp en-
dorsed Olson as its working model.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 16.
264. See I.R.C. § 108(b)(2).
265. I want to thank Professor Jim Shepard for bringing home this point to me.
266. Report of the Section 108 Real Estate and Partnership Task Force (Part I), 46 TAx LAW.
209 (Fred Witt ed., 1992); Report of the Section 108 Real Estate and Partnership Task Force (Part
II), 46 TAX LAW. 397 (Fred Witt ed., 1993) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
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The consensus of the Task Force is "that an abandonment constitutes a
taxable disposition to the bankruptcy estate, '267 based on IRC section 1398
and the fresh start policy in bankruptcy. 268 Although these two justifications
may fuel the conclusions reached, they are too thin a wedge to support the
model explicated by the Task Force.
Although the BTA "attempted to provide a comprehensive statutory
scheme regarding the tax consequences of the bankruptcy provisions," the
Task Force recognized that the tax consequences posed by abandonment
were completely overlooked. 269 Much of the justification for the Task
Force's conclusion rests on two related points. First, the Task Force believed
that because the estate and the debtor are separate taxable entities, abandon-
ment as a transfer of the property would constitute a taxable disposition.270
Second, the Task Force reasoned that under the principles of Yarbro v. Com-
missioner,271 a tax abandonment is a sale or exchange for tax purposes, and,
thus, bankruptcy abandonment should also be a sale or exchange for tax
purposes. 272
Unfortunately, the Task Force mischaracterized the nature of bank-
ruptcy abandonment and fell victim to the siren song that seeks to equate all
types of abandonment. Because a bankruptcy abandonment is a disclaimer
by the trustee of the estate's interest in the property, the fact that the estate
and the debtor are separate tax entities is really irrelevant. There is no trans-
fer that constitutes a "sale or exchange" for IRC section 1001(c) purposes.
The debtor's interest always remained in the abandoned asset; resort to the
relation back doctrine or other fictions is thus unwarranted. Furthermore, as
discussed earlier, Yarbro dealt with property and tax law abandonment, not
bankruptcy abandonment. Although it may be natural to equate the con-
cepts, it is incorrect to do so. The various concepts of abandonment are crea-
tures of their contexts, drawing life from the specific policies at play in their
own corners of the legal galaxy. I believe the Task Force shows the weakness
of its position when the only statement directly supporting the application of
Yarbro in equating tax law and bankruptcy abandonment is that "the Yarbro
analysis is equally applicable to abandonments in bankruptcy. '273 Contrary
to the manner in which the proposition is stated, it is far from self-evident.
F. National Bankruptcy Conference Model
Recently, the National Bankruptcy Conference ("Conference")
discussed the issues posed by bankruptcy abandonment as part of its Bank-
ruptcy Code Review Project. The Conference recommended that the IRC be
amended to provide that gain "realized from the sale, exemption, abandon-




271. 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
272. Task Force Report, supra note 266, at 450.
273. Task Force Report, supra note 266, at 449 (citation omitted).
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ment, foreclosure, or other disposition of assets that occurs during an individ-
ual chapter 7 or 11 case should be treated as discharge of indebtedness
income. " 27 4
In reaching its recommendation, the Conference recognized what drives
the present controversy-the disparate treatment by the IRC between can-
cellation of indebtedness income under IRC section 108 and gain realized
upon foreclosure under IRC section 1001(c). Under IRC section 108, cancel-
lation of indebtedness income that would otherwise be includable in gross
income under IRC section 61(a)(12) is excludable to the extent the taxpayer
is insolvent or the discharge occurs pursuant to a court order in bank-
ruptcy.275 However, the IRC extracts a price for the IRC section 108 exclu-
sion-certain enumerated tax attributes must be reduced by the directives of
section 108(b). If there are no tax attributes or the attributes have been used
up, any remaining cancellation of indebtedness income evaporates in bank-
ruptcy; the taxpayer is no longer liable for the tax associated with the income.
This is an important tax break for bankrupt or insolvent taxpayers which is
not provided for other taxpayers.
This tax favoritism does not exist for amounts realized under IRC sec-
tion 1001(c) upon a sale or exchange such as a foreclosure. The IRC section
108 exclusion applies only to cancellation of indebtedness income; the exclu-
sion does not apply to reduce tax liability associated with gain realized from
high-debt, low-basis property.
276
What exacerbates the situation, however, is how nonrecourse debt is
treated upon foreclosure. 277 If the secured debt is recourse, the Service has
maintained the position that the full tax consequences take two steps to as-
certain. 278 First, the amount of cancellation of indebtedness income is equal
to the difference between the fair market value of the property and the
amount of the recourse debt.279 This amount may be excluded in bankruptcy
under IRC section 108. Second, the amount realized for IRC section 1001(c)
purposes is equal to the difference between the asset's fair market value and
274. National Bankruptcy Conference, Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1993 (June 10-12, 1993)
[hereinafter NBC Report] (emphasis added).
275. I.R.C. § 108(a) (1988); see also NEWTON & BLOOM supra note 41, §§ 2.1-2.16 (analyz-
ing IRC § 108 as it applies to discharge of indebtedness income in bankruptcy proceedings).
TWo other conditions that permit a taxpayer to exclude cancellation of indebtedness income
from gross income are qualified farm indebtedness and qualified real estate indebtedness. I.R.C.
§ 108(a)(i)(C)-(D) (1988).
276. I.R.C. § 108(a).
277. For a detailed treatment of the tax consequences of foreclosure, see Mary Cunning-
ham, Payment of Debt with Property-The Two Step Analysis After Commissioner v. Tufts, 38
TAX LAW. 575, 599-605 (1985); Richard C. Onsager & John R. Becker, The Federal Income Tax
Consequences of Foreclosures and Repossessions, 18 J. REAL ESTATE TAX. 291 (1991).
278. See generally Onsager, supra note 63, at 103 (discussing tax consequences that arise in
connection with postpetition sale of property subject to recourse debt as bifurcated process).
279. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c) (1993) (providing example tax calculations on amount
realized on sale or disposition of property securing recourse debt); Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-1 C.B.
12 (holding taxpayer realizes income from discharge of indebtedness to extent amount of debt
exceeds fair market value of property).
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its adjusted basis. 280 This IRC section 1001(c) amount is not governed by the
more generous rules of exclusion in IRC section 108. The consequence of
this two-step method asserted by the Service often is that the parties who are
in informal workouts or who have agreed to terminate the automatic stay in
bankruptcy agree to a value for the underlying asset on the extreme low end
of the range of fair market values to minimize gain and to maximize cancella-
tion of indebtedness income.
If the secured debt is nonrecourse, the Supreme Court mandates signifi-
cantly different treatment. If the secured debt is nonrecourse, the amount
realized for IRC section 1001(c) purposes is equal to the difference between
the face amount of the debt and the adjusted basis in the asset.281 The fair
market value of the property is irrelevant to the calculation. This creates
greater hardship when the assets in question have substantially declined in
value, as was the experience in the real estate markets in the Southwest.
Furthermore, no cancellation of indebtedness income is generated by the full
satisfaction of nonrecourse debt by foreclosure; thus, a taxpayer cannot use
IRC section 108 to alleviate any tax associated with the foreclosure sale and
ultimate discharge of nonrecourse debt. This peculiar result has led some
taxpayers to attempt to convert nonrecourse debt for which they are not per-
sonally liable, to recourse debt for which they are personally liable in an
attempt to use IRC section 108 to minimize taxes owed from the contem-
plated foreclosure. 282
An example may illuminate the disparate treatment of nonrecourse debt
viz a viz recourse debt. In the previous example in Part IV.A, a debtor, we
shall call him Tinker, owns an office building subject to nonrecourse indebt-
edness of $1,000,000. The fair market value of the property is $500,000, and
the adjusted basis is $250,000. If the lender forecloses upon the property in
full satisfaction of the debt, the amount realized under section 1001(c) is
$750,000, the difference between the amount of nonrecourse debt and the
adjusted basis. In other words, Tinker is treated as though he sold the prop-
erty for the face amount of the debt. None of the section 1001(c) gain may
be excluded under IRC section 108; section 108 is reserved for cancellation of
indebtedness income.
In another example, let us assume that Chance operates a similar build-
ing on a property adjacent to Tinker's. In fact, she used the same lender and
granted a lien in the property securing $1,000,000 of indebtedness. She is
personally liable for the debt; that is, the debt is recourse as to Chance. The
fair market value of the property and the adjusted basis are exactly the same
280. Id.
281. Commissioner v. Tbfts, 461 U.S. 300, 310-13 (1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2; see also
Onsager, supra note 63, at 103 (discussing tax treatment given nonrecourse debt in postpetition
sale of property).
282. Of course, to the extent the conversion from nonrecourse to recourse is part of a sham
or a tax avoidance scheme, IRC § 269 (1988) will prevent its intended effects. After all, there
has been no economic change in the parties' positions. Furthermore, I believe that the Service
may characterize the conversion as an "exchange" under IRC § 1001(c).
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as in the Tinker example-500,000 and $250,000, respectively. If the lender
forecloses on the property in full satisfaction of the recourse debt, Chance's
tax consequences are vastly different from Tinker's. Using the two-step anal-
ysis asserted by the Service, Chance recognizes cancellation of indebtedness
income of $500,000, the difference between the amount of indebtedness and
the fair market value of the property. The entire amount may be excluded
from income pursuant to IRC section 108. Chance also recognizes income
under IRC section 1001(c) of $250,000, the difference between the property's
fair market value and its adjusted basis. Thus, on the same facts, Chance
recognizes $500,000 less income than Tinker solely because her debt was re-
course, and Tinker's debt was nonrecourse.
The Conference recognized this differential treatment of taxpayers. It
observed that "[tihere seems [to be] no justifications in tax or bankruptcy
policy for such quixotic results. ' 283 The Conference recognized that the
same policies that give rise to the exclusion of income under IRC section 108
also apply to gain realized under IRC section 1001(c) when the proceeds are
distributed to creditors. As a result, the Conference suggested that in a bank-
ruptcy case under chapter 7 or 11, all income attributable to the disposition of
estate property should be treated as cancellation of indebtedness income
under IRC section 108, subject to exclusion and attribute reduction. 2 4
This bold attempt by the Conference should be applauded. Equating the
treatment of section 108 income with section 1001 gain rationalizes the bank-
ruptcy process and provides a common sense solution to this difficult
problem. One must recall that when property is surrendered to a creditor by
foreclosure, neither the estate nor the debtor realizes any economic gain.
285
Thus, the Government has no legitimate claim to the tax on either type of
income. To its credit, the Conference noted that the Government does have
one legitimate concern, which is to ensure that the previously realized tax
benefits associated with the property do not survive the bankruptcy case to
exclude post-bankruptcy income.286 The Conference's proposal addressed
the Government's concern.
While the Conference's attempt to address the tax consequences posed
by bankruptcy abandonment are welcomed, I believe the Conference's pro-
posal failed to address certain issues such as whether a debtor should have to
opt out of the IRC section 1398 short-year election and who bears the tax
realized after the filing of a no-asset report by the chapter 7 trustee before
the case is closed. Finally, the modifications to IRC section 108 suggested by
the Conference appear to apply only where an individual taxpayer files a
petition under chapter 7 or 11. I believe this proposal does not go far
enough. Providing different treatment to bankrupt and insolvent taxpayers
under IRC section 108 may increase bankruptcy filings solely for tax pur-
283. NBC Report, supra note 274, at 89.
284. Id. at 90; see generally I.R.C. § 108(a)-(b) (1988) (providing for treatment of discharge
of indebtedness income).
285. NBC Report, supra note 274, at 90.
286. Id.
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poses. Furthermore, many policies advanced by the Conference apply
equally well to insolvent, nonbankrupt taxpayers. Additionally, the proposed
changes should not be limited to chapter 7 or 11 cases. Individuals should be
able to tap into the favorable treatment under any eligible chapter of the BC.
G. Proposed Model
The model for the treatment of the tax consequences of abandonment
proposed by this article borrows much from the various models analyzed.
The model builds on the theoretical scaffolding provided by the contempo-
rary models in an attempt to accommodate the legitimate interests of the
parties in treating abandonment and subsequent foreclosure for tax purposes.
It seeks to provide consistency and coherence, recognizing that the paradig-
matic models fail the complete task.
The model proposed here addresses the two related questions posed by
the tax consequences of abandonment-whether a tax should be imposed in
the first instance and, if so, upon whom. The Conference report answers
much of the first question. When property is foreclosed or otherwise surren-
dered to a creditor, the taxpayer (the debtor or the estate) receives no eco-
nomic or psychic benefit in these circumstances. The IRC recognizes this fact
when addressing cancellation of indebtedness income under IRC section 108.
Generally such income is included in gross income under IRC section 61(a).
Tax law provides a break to insolvent or bankrupt taxpayers by allowing
them to exclude such income, subject to attribute reduction. The attribute
reduction is a necessary part of this doctrine so as to accommodate the Gov-
ernment's concern that tax attributes associated with the estate property may
be used to shelter post-bankruptcy income. Common sense dictates that the
IRC recognize the same treatment for IRC section 1001(c) gain arising in
similar circumstances. This result furthers the fresh start policy embodied in
the statutory discharge provided to an individual debtor under the BC. At
the same time, it accommodates the Government's interest in collecting the
tax.
So far, the proposed model mirrors the treatment called for by the Con-
ference report. Where the proposed model diverges from the Conference
report is to expand section 108 treatment for individual debtors who file for
relief under chapters 12 and 13 and for insolvent taxpayers who have not
sought relief under the BC.
Although a separate taxable entity is created only where an individual
files for relief under chapter 7 or 11,287 the proposed expansion of the section
108 exclusion and attribute reduction rules for cancellation of indebtedness
income and section 1001 gain should be afforded to individual debtors seek-
ing relief under chapter 12 or 13 for several reasons. First, the fresh start
policy is as strong in chapter 12 or 13 as it is in chapter 7 or 11 for individual
debtors. Second, the unfairness of the tax resulting from the disposition of an
asset to the creditors exists in all chapters under the BC. Third, both bank-
287. I.R.C. §§ 1398, 1399 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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ruptcy and tax law recognize a strong policy to minimize the influence of tax
consequences in selecting under which chapter an individual debtor seeks
relief. By restricting favorable section 108 treatment to chapter 7 or 11 cases,
the Conference report conflicts with this policy. The situation becomes more
problematic in light of statistical evidence suggesting that creditors receive a
greater distribution in a chapter 13 case than in a chapter 7 case. 288 Finally,
when referring to bankruptcy taxation, conventional wisdom often suggests
different treatment between chapters 7 and 11, where a separate tax entity
exists, and the remaining chapters under Title 11. But the separate entity
rules are relevant as to who pays the tax; they do not speak about whether
the tax should be imposed in the first instance.
The proposed model would also expand the applicability of the new sec-
tion 108 exclusion and attribute reduction rules to insolvent taxpayers who
have not filed for relief under the BC. This expansion rests on two related
points. First, when enacting section 108, Congress was concerned with pro-
viding a windfall to a taxpayer due to the happenstance of bankruptcy. Thus,
it enacted section 108 with the express purpose of providing a tax benefit to
similarly situated taxpayers-insolvents and bankrupts. Second, to the ex-
tent that an insolvent taxpayer remains insolvent, the income generated by
the foreclosure or disposition of property to a creditor provides no economic
or psychic benefit. Thus, the tax associated with the property is unfair.
Section 108 addresses the Government's concern that tax attributes asso-
ciated with the property not survive to shelter post-bankruptcy income. In
return for permitting exclusion of income in certain circumstances, section
108 requires attribute reduction.2 89 Like the Conference model, the pro-
posed model recognizes this governmental concern.
Although the first major concern-whether a tax should be imposed in
the first instance-looms in the background, bankruptcy abandonment
directly conjures up the second major concern-who must pay the tax? As
previously discussed, this is a concern only in individual chapter 7 or 11
cases,29 ° since a separate taxable entity is created only in such cases.
291
The Conference proposal does not directly speak to this issue. Granted,
the issue is not as important in a situation with an expanded IRC section 108
where cancellation of indebtedness income and realized gain are treated sim-
ilarly. Nonetheless, it can be important where, pursuant to IRC section
1398(g), the estate possesses many tax attributes, some of which may not be
associated with the asset proposed to be abandoned. In this situation, the
debtor's concern for a robust fresh start is not directly implicated. Further-
more, the Government's concern about the abuse of tax attributes associated
288. This statistical evidence is on file with the author.
289. See I.R.C. § 108(b) (1988) (mandating reduction in tax attributes equal to Title 11 dis-
charge indebtedness).
290. See I.R.C. § 1398 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing that internal revenue rules relat-
ing to individual Title 11 cases apply to chapter 7 and 11 cases).
291. See I.R.C. § 1399 (1988) (providing commencement of Title 11 case does not result in
separate taxable entity).
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with the property is not directly implicated. However, the estate creditors'
interests are greatly affected by the resolution of this issue. Tax attributes
held by the estate associated with other properties may be used by the estate
to shelter estate income, which redounds to the estate creditors' benefit.
The proposed model rejects the contemporary models characterizing
abandonment as a taxable event. Bankruptcy abandonment is not an ex-
change or disposition for tax purposes; rather, bankruptcy abandonment is a
disclaimer by the trustee of the estate's interest in the abandoned property.
The debtor's interest in the property, which always remained in place
throughout bankruptcy but was subordinate to the estate's judicial lien, be-
comes the dominant interest once again.
Thus, under the proposed model, the determination as to who is respon-
sible for the tax depends on when the taxable event, such as the foreclosure
takes place. Like the Olson model, if the foreclosure occurs when the asset is
estate property, the estate and not the debtor is liable for the tax. With an
expanded application of the IRC section 108 exclusion and attribute reduc-
tion rules, the result may require the estate to reduce not only the attributes
associated with the property, but also other delineated tax attributes.292 If
the foreclosure occurs after abandonment when the property is no longer
property of the estate, then the debtor is liable for the tax, but the debtor
may take advantage of the expanded IRC section 108 attribute reduction
rules. To protect the Government's concern regarding the misuse of tax at-
tributes, the proposed model provides for the transfer of the tax attributes
associated with the abandoned property to the debtor. Furthermore, as to
net operating losses, credits, and other IRC section 1398(g) tax attributes that
are not necessarily interwoven with a particular asset, the Service should pro-
pose regulations allocating such attributes in a reasonable fashion to the
abandoned assets. Thus, IRC section 1398 should be modified to provide
that the debtor must reduce the tax attributes associated with the property in
accordance with the expanded version of IRC section 108. As a result, the
estate does not receive the windfall present under the Olson model by shift-
ing the tax burden to the debtor while retaining the tax benefits associated
with the abandoned property. 293
A major deficiency in the contemporary models is their failure to
address the practicalities of the overwhelming number of individual bank-
ruptcy cases. A trustee has a duty to abandon property of inconsequential
value and benefit to the estate; failure to do so should result in either a
surcharge on the trustee's bond or personal liability of the trustee.294 This is
292. See id. § 108 (mandating tax attribute reduction).
293. Recall that this windfall to the estate may be illusory. See supra notes 264-65 and
accompanying text.
294. A conflict exists regarding when personal liability should be imposed on a bankruptcy
trustee. Compare Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee, 819 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1987)(holding trustee's conduct must be intentional); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451,
461-62 (6th Cir. 1982) (same) and Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977) (same)
with In re Gorski, 766 F.2d 723, 727 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding trustee may be held liable for negli-
1994]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
especially true when the trustee fails to abandon property that results in a
substantial tax to the estate.295 Nonetheless, it is a fact that most bankruptcy
filings by individuals are "no-asset" cases. In a "no-asset" case, no assets will
remain for distribution to the unsecured creditors once the secured creditors
receive the value of their collateral and the debtor declares his or her exemp-
tions under BC section 522. The determination of whether the case is a no-
asset case is made by the chapter 7 trustee, usually at the first meeting of
creditors or soon thereafter. 296 Once the trustee decides that the bankruptcy
is a no-asset case, he or she files a "no-asset report." Most often, this means
that the trustee has essentially washed his or her hands of the case. This is
imprudent as evidenced by the discussion below.
The filing of a no-asset report is not a deemed abandonment of property
under BC section 554(c). Thus, a foreclosure that occurs after the no-asset
report is filed but before the case is closed generates a tax liability that is an
administrative expense of the estate; the debtor is not liable for any tax. This
creates two problems. First, the Service may not collect the tax from the
debtor, which it would be empowered to do under present law if an abandon-
ment had occurred before foreclosure. Under this scenario, the Service is
harmed because the estate has no assets to pay any claims. Its only redress is
against the trustee for breach of fiduciary duties owed to estate creditors.
297
Second, it is not uncommon for no-asset cases to become asset cases. A large
inheritance in certain circumstances after the case was commenced,
298 the
recovery of fraudulent transfers and avoidable preferences,
299 or the identifi-
cation of assets of the debtor concealed or forgotten3°° may transform a no-
asset case into an asset case. Yet, if a foreclosure had occurred while an asset
was property of the estate, the tax associated with the asset is a first priority
administrative expense claim. This result has a direct and substantial finan-
cial impact on the estate's unsecured creditors, who must wait to participate
in the newly found assets until the Government is paid in full.
30 1
The short answer is that even in a no-asset case, the trustee should aban-
don property of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. However,
this procedure is costly. In a no-asset case, the trustee must pay the costs
associated with a proposed abandonment out of his or her own pocket or fear
gent and intentional misconduct); Red Carpet Corp. v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1576, 1578 (11th Cir.
1983) (same); In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1983) (same) and In
re Sturm, 121 B.R. 443, 447 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (same).
295. The Service has asserted the position that a trustee who fails to abandon such property
is personally liable for the tax. Letter from District Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Midwest
Region to Anonymous Trustee (Dec. 3, 1992) (on file with author).
296. See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1988) (providing for meeting of creditors).
297. See id. § 704 (1988) (delineating trustee's duties).
298. See id. § 541(a)(5) (1988) (providing property received by bequest, devise, or inheri-
tance within 180 days after filing of petition become part of the bankrupt estate).
299. See id. §§ 547-548 (relating to voidable preferences and fraudulent conveyances).
300. An example of this situation is the forgotten tax refund check.
301. See 11 U.S.C. 99 507, 726 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (providing priority for government tax
claims).
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personal liability. This result is unacceptable. The model proposed here
modifies BC section 554 by providing that the filing by a chapter 7 trustee of
a no-asset report constitutes a deemed abandonment of assets listed in a
debtor's schedules unless the report provides otherwise. This modification
more accurately reflects the intention and understanding of the parties
involved.
The final dimension of the model proposed in this article deals with the
mechanics of the short-year election.30 2 Presently, an individual debtor must
elect to bifurcate his or her tax year to take advantage of the tax benefits in
IRC section 1398. This election must be made on or within the fifteenth day
of the fourth full month from the commencement of the case.30 3 Failure to
make the election in a timely manner results in a waiver of the section 1398
tax benefits.
The overwhelming majority of cases benefit from the section 1398(d)(2)
short-year election. Yet, many debtors fail to make a timely election because
of miscalculations or incompetent counsel. Section 1398 should be modified
to provide for its automatic application in all cases. A debtor should be re-
quired to opt out of section 1398(d)(2) short-year treatment. This modifica-
tion should reduce the failure to use the benefits provided by IRC section
1398 and further the fresh start policy embodied in both the BC and IRC.
V. CONCLUSION
Greek legend tells of a bandit named Procustes who guarded a mountain
pass, stopping all travelers on their way. He had a bed and would force the
traveler to lie on it. If the traveler was too tall for the bed, Procustes cut off
his legs; if the traveler was too short, Procustes stretched the traveler, pulling
out his legs and arms until he fit. Midstream bankruptcy abandonment is a
Procustean bed; each relevant BC and IRC section is like the unwary traveler
in Procustes's day. None seems to fit the bed just right.
The paradigmatic models analyzed in this article generally fail the task
of providing a comprehensive model for treating the tax consequences of
bankruptcy abandonment. Some models fail to appreciate the distinct nature
of bankruptcy abandonment. Other models pose fundamental questions of
fairness regarding the imposition and assignment of the tax. Still other mod-
els generate incentives to seek bankruptcy relief solely to take advantage of
certain tax breaks, gravely disrupting the time-honored tax principle of hori-
zontal equity-treating similarly situated taxpayers equally.3°4
Presently, the debate centers on who pays the tax-the estate or the
individual debtor. Although important, this question obscures a more funda-
302. See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (permitting debtor to create two taxa-
ble years).
303. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the short-year
election.




mental question-whether a tax is to be imposed in the first instance. The
model proposed here answers this fundamental question by resorting to the
mechanism already carefully crafted in IRC section 108. By expanding the
applicability of IRC section 108 to cover the IRC section 1001(c) gain gener-
ated by a transfer of property to a creditor in satisfaction of a debt, the
proposed model permits exclusion of the income associated with such trans-
fer from gross income in exchange for attribute reduction. Thus, IRC section
108 provides the basic framework, which accommodates the interests of the
debtor, the creditors, and the Government. Allowing both insolvent and
bankrupt taxpayers the ability to use expanded IRC section 108 will minimize
the strategic use of bankruptcy for tax purposes and preserve the horizontal
equity of tax law. In addition, requiring that tax attributes associated with
abandoned property be transferred to the debtor along with the property
ameliorates the unfairness of some models. Finally, the addition of
provisions which establish that the filing of a no-asset report by a trustee
constitutes a deemed abandonment and which require that an individual
debtor opt out of IRC section 1398 treatment more closely aligns the law
with the expectations of the parties.
The present state of the law is an unacceptable alchemy of risk taking
(or aversion) and specialized knowledge. If a debtor does not want to be
burdened with a realized gain tax under IRC section 1001(c), he or she may
file a bankruptcy petition, hope for a neglectful or tax-ignorant trustee, and
hasten asset foreclosure while such asset is estate property. If successful, the
estate is liable for the tax and the debtor absolves himself or herself of tax
liability. The knowledgeable trustee, however, will recognize this set-up and
abandon the property before foreclosure. In that case, the debtor owes the
entire tax; the tax is not an allowable claim of the estate and is nondischarge-
able. Fearful of this worst-case scenario, a debtor may allow foreclosure of
the property on the eve of the bankruptcy filing, make a timely IRC section
1398(d)(2) election, close the short taxable year, and shift at least part of the
tax liability to the bankruptcy estate as a seventh-level priority claim. How-
ever, any remaining tax is a nondischargeable claim that may significantly
throttle a debtor's fresh start.
There is no justification for the perverse incentives now existing in the
interface between bankruptcy and tax law. The proposed model opts for a
comprehensive, uniform rule that thoroughly addresses the problems posed
by the tax consequences of bankruptcy abandonment. Such problems
provide us with an enlightening peek at the fundamental contradiction in
bankruptcy law. On the one hand, bankruptcy is viewed as providing a col-
lective debt-collection forum ostensibly for the estate creditors' benefit, and
in their best interests. On the other hand, bankruptcy law magically conjures
up the right to discharge one's debts (or reorganize one's business), a result
alien to the long history of bankruptcy law and creditors' rights. To date, the
system of bankruptcy has been described as a bivalent one, with strings of
yes's and no's, ones and zeroes. Authorities search for the primacy of the two
competing bankruptcy goals-rehabilitating debtors and protecting creditors'
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interests-failing or refusing to recognize not only the inherent contradiction
posed by the two irreconcilable policies, but also the multivalent or fuzzy
nature of bankruptcy law as a continuous system.305 The hard truth is that
there is no universal heuristic to solve the bankruptcy paradox; there are only
partial truths. This is the nature of a fuzzy system. And the partial truths we
cling to say more about us, the way we think, and the way we envision the
world than they do about the system we attempt to describe.
305. See Jack F. Williams, Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied
to Intercorporate Guarantees: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CAaRDozo L. REv.
1403 (1904) (suggesting use of fuzzy logic in interpreting BC); see also Leif M. Clark, Fuzzy
Thinking and Legislating Logically, XII A.B.I.J. 14 (Dec. 1994) (same); Leif M. Clark, Some
Fuzzy Thoughts, XII A.B.I.J. 14 (Sept. 1993); Mark E. MacDonald et al., Chapter 11 as a Dy-
namic Evolutionary Learning Process in a Market with Fuzzy Values, 1993 AN. SURV. BANKR.
L. 1 (same). For a general account of fuzzy logic, see BART KOSKO, Fuzzy THINKIING: THE
NEW SCIENCE OF Fuzzy LOGIC (1993).
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